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EXECUTIVE PAY CLAWBACKS AND THEIR TAXATION 
 
FORTHCOMING, 24 FLA. TAX REV. (2021) 
 





 Executive pay clawback provisions require executives to repay 
previously received compensation under certain circumstances, such as a 
downward adjustment to the financial results upon which their incentive pay 
was predicated.  The use of these provisions is on the rise, and the SEC is 
expected to soon finalize rules implementing a mandatory, no-fault clawback 
requirement enacted as part of the Dodd-Frank legislation.  The tax issue 
raised by clawbacks is this: should executives be allowed to recover taxes 
previously paid on compensation that is returned to the company as a result 
of a clawback provision?  This Article argues that a full tax offset regime is most 
in keeping with the evolving rationales for clawbacks, with consistent 
treatment of executives subject to clawbacks, with encouraging even-handed 
implementation of clawbacks, and with minimizing clawback induced 
distortions and other unintended consequences associated with a tax regime 
that would not provide full offsets.  But the tax treatment of clawback 
payments has been uncertain, and the enactment of the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act 
adds to that uncertainty.  Meanwhile, adoption of legislation to ensure that 
executives are fully compensated for taxes previously paid on recouped 
compensation is probably a political non-starter.  Given that, this Article 
argues that the IRS and courts should interpret the relevant tax laws liberally 
to maximize recovery of taxes paid on clawed back compensation.  
 
* Professor of Law and Maurice Poch Faculty Research Scholar, Boston University School 
of Law.  For their valuable comments and suggestions, the author thanks Alan Feld, Ted Sims, 
and Rory Van Loo.  The author thanks Roy Fan and Brian Straughn for excellent research 
assistance. 
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Executive pay clawback provisions require executives to forfeit previously 
received compensation under certain circumstances, most notably after a downward 
adjustment to the financial results upon which their incentive compensation was 
predicated.  Clawback provisions are on the rise.  Limited clawbacks were mandated 
under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002.1  The Dodd-Frank legislation, enacted in 2010, 
mandated a much more comprehensive no-fault clawback regime,2 and the SEC is in 
the process of finalizing rules to implement the Dodd-Frank clawback.3  Meanwhile, 
the fraction of S&P 1500 companies proactively adopting clawback provisions more 
expansive than those mandated by SOX has increased from less than 1% in 2004 to 
62% in 2013.4  
 
This article focuses on the federal income tax consequences of clawbacks, 
specifically on the tax treatment of repayments by executives in cases in which the 
compensation repaid has been included in taxable income in a prior year.  This is 
surprisingly under-explored terrain, 5  particularly given that individual taxes can 
consume as much as 50% of executive compensation. 
 
 
1  Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002) [hereinafter SOX] 
(codified in scattered sections of 11, 15, 18, 28, and 29 U.S.C.). 
2 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, § 954, Pub. L. No. 111–203, 124 
Stat. 1376 (2010) [hereinafter Dodd-Frank]. 
3 The SEC released proposed rules implementing the Dodd-Frank clawback on July 1, 2015.  See 
Listing Standards for Recovery of Erroneously Awarded Compensation, Dodd-Frank Act Release No. 
33-9861 (July 1, 2015), 80 Fed. Reg. 41144 (proposed July 14, 2015) [hereinafter SEC Release]. 
4 Ilona Babenko et al, Clawback Provisions and Firm Risk 42 (working paper, April 30, 2019) 
[hereinafter BBBCS].   
5 Several law review articles have addressed clawback provisions from a corporate governance 
perspective, either as their primary focus, e.g., Jesse Fried & Nitzan Shilon, Excess-Pay Clawbacks, 36 J 
Corp. L. 721 (2011); Jesse M. Fried, Rationalizing the Dodd-Frank Clawback (working paper 2016); John 
Patrick Kelsh, Section 304 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002: The Case for a Personal Culpability 
Requirement, 59 BUS. LAWYER 1005, 1017-19 (2004); or at least in passing, e.g., Kevin J. Murphy & 
Michael C. Jensen, The Politics of Pay: The Unintended Consequences of Regulating Executive 
Compensation 41 (working paper, April 18, 2018); Stephen M. Bainbridge, Dodd-Frank: Quack Federal 
Corporate Governance Round II, 95 MINN. L. REV. 1779 (2011); Sanjai Bhagat & Roberto Romano, 
Reforming Executive Compensation: Focusing and Committing to the Long-term, 26 YALE J. ON REG. 359, 
366 (2009); Steven A. Bank & George S. Georgiev, Paying High for Low Performance, 100 MINN. L. REV 
HEADNOTES 14.  Meanwhile, a number of researchers from the finance and accounting disciplines have 
investigated the implications of clawback provisions for firm value and risk, e.g., BBBCS, supra note 4; 
Tor-Erik Bakke et al, Do Clawbacks have Claws? The Value Implications of Mandatory Clawback 
Provisions (working paper, 2017).  To date, however, there has been little academic discussion of the 
tax policy implications of clawbacks.  Exceptions include Matthew A. Melone, Adding Insult to Injury: 
The Federal Income Tax Consequences of the Clawback of Executive Compensation, 25 AKRON TAX J., 55 
(2010) and Rosina B. Barker & Kevin P. O’Brien, Taxing Clawbacks: Theory and Practice, TAX NOTES (Oct. 
25, 2010) at 423.  Although not directly aimed at clawback provisions, Professor Douglas Kahn has 
recently published a highly relevant article in Tax Notes: Douglas A. Kahn, Return of an Employee’s 
Claim of Right Income, TAX NOTES (June 17, 2019) at 1819. 
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Imagine the following scenario.  In 2019, Executive receives a $1 million cash 
bonus based on the company’s achievement of a certain earnings target.  In 2020, the 
company restates and reduces 2019 earnings.  Based on the restated earnings, 
Executive would have been entitled to a $700,000 bonus for 2019, and under the 
Dodd-Frank clawback regime, the Executive is required to repay $300,000 to her 
company.  Assuming that the company was able to deduct the payment in 2019, it will 
be required to include the repaid amount in taxable income for 2020.  Executive will 
have included and paid tax on $1 million of compensation in 2019.  Should she receive 
a deduction in 2020 for the $300,000 repayment?  Should the answer depend on 
whether Executive signed off on the 2019 earnings figure?  On whether Executive 
“cooked the books” herself or enlisted an underling to do so?  What if a deduction is 
allowed but, due to various limitations discussed below, fails to make Executive whole 
for the taxes incurred on the repaid compensation?  Should additional relief be 
available?   
 
These are very real, and with implementation of the mandatory, no-fault, 
Dodd-Frank clawback looming, likely soon to be very pressing issues.  This article 
considers these questions, focusing first on what the tax rules optimally should be.  I 
conclude that optimally executives should be made whole for taxes paid on 
compensation that is subsequently repaid as a result of a clawback provision.  This 
result is dictated most strongly if the underlying rationale for clawbacks is prevention 
of unjust enrichment and/or facilitating the management of executive risk-taking 
incentives.  If the primary goal of clawbacks is to minimize the payoffs to and thus the 
amount of financial misreporting, one could argue that deductibility of clawback 
repayments is unnecessary and possibly even counter-productive.  Even in this case, 
however, the risk of mistake and false positives weighs in favor of refunding 
previously paid tax.6   
 
But there are other reasons to prefer a clawback tax regime providing full 
recovery of tax paid on compensation that is subsequently returned. First, a full tax 
offset approach will provide consistent tax treatment of executives irrespective of 
their decision to defer compensation and tax and will avoid punishing innocent 
executives forced to repay compensation under no-fault clawback regimes.  Second, 
executives and firms are less likely to voluntarily adopt comprehensive and 
meaningful clawback provisions, or to fairly enforce mandatory clawback obligations, 
if the tax treatment is asymmetric, that is, if taxes are not fully refunded when 
compensation is repaid, and, to the extent that taxes are not fully refunded, we can 
expect that executives will demand to be compensated for the tax risk. 7   Third, 
whether mandated or voluntarily adopted, the existence of clawback provisions may 
distort the design of executive pay, and asymmetric tax treatment of repayments may 
 
6 Infra Part III.C. 
7 Compensation could take the form of ex ante increases in pay to offset the tax risk or tax “gross 
up” payments in the event that clawbacks do not result in full refunds of previously paid tax.  This 
Article considers both possibilities. 
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amplify those distortions.  When these additional effects are considered, the case for 
refunding becomes stronger, whatever the rationale for clawback adoption.8 
 
How does present tax law match up?  It’s complicated, but in a nutshell, 
repayment of clawed back compensation generally should be deductible by 
executives as ordinary and necessary business deductions under IRC §162 or as 
business losses under §165.  But basic deductibility is only one part of the equation.  
The §§ 162/165 deduction for clawed back compensation is a miscellaneous itemized 
deduction (MID).  Prior to 2018, MID’s were deductible only to the extent that they 
exceeded 2% of AGI, were not deductible for purposes of the alternative minimum 
tax, and were, along with other itemized deductions, phased down for high income 
taxpayers under IRC § 68.  As a result, a deduction for compensation repaid was 
unlikely to make an executive whole for taxes paid on that compensation in prior 
years.  The basic deductibility picture became clearer, but much worse, with the 
passage of the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act (TCJA).  Under that legislation, MIDs are simply 
not deductible for tax years 2018 through 2025.  So, as far as we have gone, there 
would be no effective deduction for compensation clawed back in any of the next five 
years.9 
 
But that brings us to IRC § 1341, a provision that can make taxpayers whole 
for repayments of amounts received under a “claim of right” that are later repaid.  
When it applies, § 1341 provides a non-miscellaneous itemized deduction (still 
deductible under the TCJA) equal to the value of the current year deduction under §§ 
162/165 or, if more valuable, a tax credit equal to the reduction in tax in prior years 
that would have occurred had the recouped compensation never been included in 
income in the first place.10   
 
The bottom line here is that § 1341 could be applied to executive pay 
clawbacks to get to the right result, or close to the right result, in most cases.  
However, there is a significant risk that it will be applied in such a way as to bar 
recovery in an excessive number of cases.  Ideally, Congress or the Treasury would 
amend § 1341 or the regulations thereunder to make it clear that executives should 
be made whole for taxes paid on clawed back compensation, but this may be unlikely 
in the present environment.  Moreover, there is a concern about optics.  Allowing 
deductions for repaid compensation, particularly in cases in which the executive 
doing the repaying is at fault, looks like a tax subsidy for bad behavior.  It isn’t a 
subsidy, but if clawbacks become frequent and if executives succeed in employing § 
1341 to recoup the tax paid on clawed back compensation, it would not be surprising 
if one or more members of Congress proposed legislation to bar such deductions.   
Perhaps the best we can hope for is that the courts will construe § 1341 liberally to 
allow deduction and that Congress and the Treasury will do nothing. 
 
 
8 Infra Part III.C.2. 
9 Infra Part IV.A. 
10 Infra Part IV.B. 
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The remainder of the Article is organized as follows.  Part II provides an 
overview of clawback provisions, including existing and forthcoming legislatively 
mandated clawbacks as well as provisions that companies have voluntarily adopted.  
This Part highlights a shift from clawbacks apparently aimed at deterrence of 
financial misreporting to prevention of unjust enrichment.  Part III considers from 
several perspectives how clawback payments should ideally be taxed and concludes 
that the optimal regime would allow executives full recovery of taxes previously paid 
on returned funds.  Part IV explores the current taxation of clawed back 
compensation.  It argues that full recovery of taxes previously paid on clawed back 
compensation should be available under IRC § 1341 for executives who are not 
culpable, but that there is a great deal of uncertainty, including uncertainty resulting 
from the enactment of the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act.  Part V briefly pulls together the 
previous Parts arguing that, while the most probable tax treatment under § 1341 is 
roughly consistent with clawback rationales, a tax regime ensuring full offset of 
previously paid tax would be superior.  Part VI briefly considers two other possible 
responses to asymmetric tax treatment of clawbacks: increased use of deferred 
compensation and associated issues under IRC § 409A and the possibility of reducing 
an executive’s future compensation in lieu of actually clawing back compensation.  
Part VII concludes and very briefly highlights the political economy impediments to 
enacting legislation that would ensure full recovery of taxes previously paid on 
recouped compensation. 
 
II. CLAWBACK PROVISIONS: SOURCES, DESIGN, AND RATIONALES 
 
 This Part provides a brief look into the sources, design, and rationales behind 
executive pay clawbacks.  First, I explore the clawback regimes mandated under SOX, 
TARP, and Dodd-Frank.  Then I consider the features of clawback arrangements 
voluntarily adopted by public companies.  Finally, I consider rationales for clawback 
adoption or imposition, both what Congress and firms have said in adopting 
clawbacks and what the design elements implicitly tell us about rationales.  The 
rationales matter when it comes to thinking about the appropriate clawback tax rules, 
and I will argue that more recent clawback regimes reflect a shift in focus from 
curtailing financial misreporting to preventing unjust enrichment of executives.   
A. Clawback Legislation 
Over the last twenty years, three pieces of federal legislation have been 
enacted that impose executive pay clawback obligations on public companies: the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX),11 the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) under 
the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008,12 and the Dodd-Frank Wall Street 
Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 (Dodd-Frank). 13   The clawback 
 
11 SOX § 304. 
12 Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-343, 122 Stat. 3765 (2002) 
[hereinafter EESA]. 
13 Dodd-Frank § 954. 
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provisions in these statutes vary in terms of the events that trigger a clawback 
obligation, the population of executives that is covered, the types of compensation 





 Enacted in the wake of accounting frauds at Enron, Worldcom, and other firms, 
SOX § 304 provides that in the event of an accounting restatement due to material 
noncompliance with financial reporting requirements resulting from misconduct, an 
issuer’s CEO and CFO “shall reimburse the issuer for any bonus or other incentive-
based or equity-based compensation received” by the CEO or CFO within the twelve 
month period following the filing of the financial statement that gave rise to the 
restatement and to profits on company stock sold within the same period. 14  
Misconduct on the part of the CEO/CFO is not required to trigger the SOX clawback; 
it is sufficient that some misconduct within the organization led to restatement.15   
 
 The SOX clawback reaches any incentive or equity-based compensation 
received by a restating firm’s CEO/CFO within the prescribed period, not just the 
excess pay attributable to the erroneous financial report.  However, there is no 
private right of action under § 304.  Enforcement is solely in the hands of and at the 
discretion of the SEC.  That discretion was used somewhat sparingly during the first 
five to ten years following SOX enactment, but the SEC apparently has increased § 304 
enforcement activities in recent years, in some cases holding CEOs and CFOs strictly 




 Between 2008 and 2014, in the wake of the 2007/2008 financial crisis, the 
Treasury purchased “troubled” assets from a number of major financial institutions 
and held ownership stakes in these institutions.  During the period in which the U.S. 
was directly invested in these institutions, § 111 of the Emergency Economic 
Stabilization Act of 2008 (aka TARP) directed the Treasury Secretary to require that 
the institutions adopt certain corporate governance and compensation policies, 
including “a provision for the recovery by the financial institution of any bonus or 
incentive compensation paid to a senior executive officer based on statements of 
earnings, gains, or other criteria that are later proven to be inaccurate….”17   
 
 
14 SOX § 304(a). 
15 SEC v. Jensen, 835 F.3d 1100 (9th Cir. 2016).  See also SEC v. Jenkins, 718 F.Supp. 2d 1070 (D. Ariz. 
2010).  See also Tax Management Portfolio 390 (6th) at note 677. 
16 Stuart Gelfond & David Hennes, Sarbanes-Oxley Section 304: A Sharper Tool in the Enforcement 
Toolbox, CORPORATE BOARD MEMBER MAG. (2d Qtr. 2010) (noting that the SEC brought only 10 
enforcement actions under § 304 between 2002 and 2008 and that these actions all involved CEO or 
CFO misconduct but highlighting the SEC’s later adoption of “a more expansive view of liability”). 
17 EESA § 111(b)(2)(B). 
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 The TARP clawback applied to the top five most highly compensated 
executives of public and private companies.18  Unlike the SOX clawback, the TARP 
clawback was not predicated on misconduct.  Moreover, it was not predicated 
explicitly on an accounting restatement, although presumably situations in which 
earnings are later proven to be inaccurate would generally correspond with 
restatements.  It is somewhat unclear whether a clawback of a bonus “based on” an 
inaccurate statement of earnings would entail recovery of the entire bonus or only of 
the portion of the bonus associated with the over-reported earnings.  In any event, 
now that all TARP positions have been unwound, the TARP clawback is no longer in 
force. 
 
3.  Dodd-Frank 
 
 A much more expansive clawback mandate was promulgated in § 954 of the 
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010.  That section, 
codified as § 10D of the Securities Exchange Act, requires the SEC to direct the 
national securities exchanges to prohibit the listing of any security of an issuer that 
fails to adopt a clawback policy with certain features or to properly disclose that 
policy. 
 
 Dodd-Frank compliant clawbacks are triggered by financial restatements 
arising from material noncompliance with financial reporting requirements and 
require issuers to “recover from any current and former executive officer of the issuer 
who received incentive-based compensation (including stock options awarded as 
compensation) during the 3-year period preceding” the restatement the amount of 
that compensation in excess of the amount that would have been paid but for the 
erroneous financials.19  This is a no-fault clawback that applies irrespective of any 
misconduct. 
 
 Dodd-Frank § 954 is not self-implementing, but requires an SEC rule.  The SEC 
proposed such a rule, 10D-1, in 2015.  The proposed rule tracks § 954, of course, and 
expands upon and explains its various provisions, detailing, for example, exactly 
which executives and what types of compensation are subject to the clawback20 and 
how firms should go about determining the amount of excess compensation to be 
clawed back following a restatement.21 
 
Proposed rule 10D-1 has not yet been implemented.  The Financial CHOICE 
Act of 2017 would have amended SEA § 10D to limit the application of the Dodd-Frank 
clawback to “such executive officer[s who] had control or authority over the financial 
reporting that resulted in the accounting restatement,”22 but the CHOICE Act did not 
 
18 EESA § 111(b)(3). 
19 Dodd-Frank § 954, codified as SEA § 10D(b). 
20 SEC Release, supra note 3, at 32, 38. 
21 SEC Release, supra note 3, at 58. 
22 Financial CHOICE Act of 2017, § 849. 
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become law.  Presumably, the SEC will soon finalize the Dodd-Frank clawback rules.  
In a 2018 speech, then SEC Chairman Jay Clayton noted the “serial” approach the SEC 
was taking with respect to the rollout of the Dodd-Frank executive pay mandates, his 
satisfaction with the Dodd-Frank mandated CEO pay ratio rules adopted in 2015, and 
discussions within the commission regarding “how best to address the remaining 
mandatory executive compensation rules,” i.e., the Dodd-Frank clawback provision.23 
B.  Employer-Initiated Clawbacks  
 The number of U.S. public companies voluntarily adopting clawback policies 
has increased dramatically over the last two decades.  Babenko, Bennett, Bizjak, Coles 
and Sandvik (BBBCS) analyzed data gleaned from proxy statements of S&P 1500 
companies between 2000 and 2013.24  They found that through 2004, less than 1% 
of the S&P 1500 had implemented a clawback policy, but that in 2013 the fraction had 
grown to 62%.25 
 
 The terms of these employer-initiated clawbacks are heterogeneous.  BBBCS 
found that firms often report multiple, independent clawback triggers but that the 
most popular triggers are earnings restatements (included as a trigger by 77% of 
firms with a clawback), misconduct (52%), fraud (31%), and violation of a non-
compete agreement (27%).26  Of the clawback provisions that addressed coverage, 
56% of firms extended clawbacks to executives beyond the “top 5.”27  69% of firms 
limit clawback obligations to executives directly responsible for a triggering event, 
while 31% extend clawback obligations to executives who are not directly 
responsible. 28   There is also heterogeneity with respect to the amount of 
compensation covered by the clawback.  Most commonly, the full amount of a cash 
bonus or equity based award may be recouped if a clawback provision is triggered, 
but a substantial minority of firms (ranging from 39% to 45%, depending on the type 
of compensation) limit clawbacks to the gains associated with the restated financials, 
fraud, misconduct, etc. 29   Employer-initiated clawback policies generally are 
overseen by a firm’s compensation committee or the entire board of directors, and in 
a majority of cases the overseer has the discretion to determine whether a triggering 
event has occurred and the amounts to be recouped, if any.30   
 
 
23 SEC Chairman Jay Clayton, Opening Remarks at the Securities Regulation Institute, Jan. 22, 
2018. 
24 BBBCS, supra note 4, at 42.  The S&P 1500 data was compiled by Incentive Lab, now an arm of 
Institutional Shareholder Services.  BBBCS also analyzed data from a larger sample of companies 
included in the Compustat database and found a similar increase over a broader time frame.  Id. 
25 Id. at 42, fig. 2. 
26 Id. at 45 (Table 2, Panel B).  Clawbacks predicated on violation of non-compete, non-solicitation, 
non-disclosure or similar contractual obligations are known in the industry as “bad boy” clawbacks. 
27 Id. at 46 (Table 2, Panel C). 
28 Id. at 46 (Table 2, Panel D). 
29 Id. at 46 (Table 2, Panel E). 
30 Id. at 47 (Table 2, Panels G and H). 
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 Apparently, companies have only occasionally enforced voluntarily adopted 
clawback policies.  BBBCS identified 272 instances in which a company restated 
earnings after adopting a clawback provision and only 5 instances in which the board 
disclosed that the company sought to recoup compensation.31  They identified 3 other 
instances more recently.32  They also note, however, that in some cases compensation 
may be “voluntarily” returned, avoiding the need to formally trigger a clawback 
policy.33 
C.  Clawback Rationales 
 Clawback provisions might be mandated legislatively or adopted by firms 
voluntarily for a number of reasons.  These reasons fall into two or perhaps three 
broad categories – an attempt to influence executive behavior ex ante, the prevention 
of unjust enrichment ex post, and compliance with investor wishes/best practices.  
And, of course, these rationales need not be mutually exclusive.  We can learn 
something about the reasons for clawback adoption from legislative histories or 
discussions in proxy statements, but arguably the most persuasive evidence of 




 Under § 302 of SOX, public company CEOs and CFOs are required to certify the 
accuracy and completeness of their annual and quarterly financial reports and the 
adequacy of internal controls.  The clawback provision under § 304 backs up the 
certification requirement by placing CEO and CFO compensation at risk.  Promulgated 
in the wake of massive frauds at Enron, Worldcom and other issuers, these provisions 
clearly were intended to reduce such fraud by reducing the incentive of these senior 
executives to misstate their financials in order to increase incentive compensation 
payouts. 34   The design of the SOX clawback reinforces the view that behavioral 
modification was a significant goal.  The mandate extends only to restatements 
arising from misconduct.  Clawback exposure is limited to the CEO and CFO – the two 
executives with the most influence over a firm’s financial reporting quality.  And SOX 
clawbacks are not limited to excess compensation associated with a restatement.  The 
entirety of incentive pay received within a specified window is at risk as well as 
 
31 Id. at 29. 
32 Id. 
33 Id. at 30.  Anecdotal evidence suggests that clawback policies are becoming more aggressive, 
evolving, for example, from “double trigger” policies that required a restatement and unethical conduct 
to policies that follow the Dodd-Frank blueprint and are triggered solely by financial restatements.  See 
Korn Ferry, Trigger Happy: Will Clawback Offenses Grow? (May 30, 2019), 
https://www.kornferry.com/insights/articles/ceo-compensation-clawback. 
34 The report of the House Committee on Financial Services made it clear that its intent was to 
limit disgorgement to cases in which “extreme misconduct” by an executive was provable.  But the 
Senate version of the bill was enacted, and the report of the Senate Banking Committee was ambiguous 
with respect to scienter.  See Kelsh, supra note 5, at 1017-19.  Either way, it seems clear that the 
underlying rationale for § 304 was to combat accounting fraud. 
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profits from share sales during this period.  When invoked by the SEC, the SOX 
clawback is a sledgehammer. 
 
 To be sure, even the SOX clawback design suggests some attention to ex post 
unjust enrichment.  A CEO or CFO can be forced to disgorge incentive pay or trading 
profits even if he or she was completely unaware of the financial reporting 
misconduct of a subordinate.  This feature appears to reflect President George W. 
Bush’s 2002 recommendation that “CEOs or other officers should not be allowed to 
profit from erroneous financial statements.” 35   But, of course, as CEOs and CFOs 
ultimately are responsible for the quality of their firms’ financial reporting, explicitly 
so after the enactment of SOX § 302, enforcing a clawback against them in cases of 
misconduct within their firms without evidence of personal misconduct is also 
consistent with a desire to maximize the pressure on these individuals to ensure 




The structure of the Dodd-Frank clawback provision and the act’s legislative 
history suggest an increased emphasis on ex post unjust enrichment relative to ex 
ante behavioral modification, at least as compared to the SOX clawback.  In its analysis 
of § 954, the Senate Banking Committee explained that clawback provision “requires 
public companies to recover money that they erroneously paid in incentive 
compensation to executives as a result of material noncompliance with accounting 
rules.  This is money that the executive would not have received if the accounting was 
done properly and was not entitled to.”36  The committee further expressed its belief 
that “it is unfair to shareholders for corporations to allow executives to retain 
compensation that they were erroneously awarded.”37  The Committee report says 
nothing about deterring misreporting or other aberrant behavior. 
 
To be sure, the Senate Banking Committee report on § 954 consists of only two 
paragraphs.  Behavioral modification might have been an unspoken rationale for 
adoption, but the structure of § 954 also is consistent with the stated rationale of 
avoiding unjust enrichment and unfairness.  Recall that the Dodd-Frank clawback is 
a strict liability, no-fault provision.  It applies to a sizeable group of executives; not 
just executives with control or influence over financial reporting.  And most 
importantly, under Dodd-Frank, it is only the unearned portion of compensation that 
is clawed back.   
 
 
35 George W. Bush, Fact Sheet: Corporate Fraud Conference Sponsored by President’s Corporate 
Fraud Task Force, Sept. 26, 2002 (detailing the President’s “Ten-Point Plan to Improve Corporate 
Responsibility and Protect America’s Shareholders,” announced on March 7, 2002). 
36 Report of the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, S.3217, Report No. 
111-176, at 135-36 (April 30, 2010) (emphasis added). 
37 Id. 
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 A number of commentators have criticized the Dodd-Frank clawback 
provision as being poorly designed to address incentives to misstate financial results.  
Professor Bainbridge labeled Dodd-Frank “quack federal corporate governance 
round two,”38 and argued that the Dodd-Frank clawback provision was over-inclusive 
since it “encompasses all executive officers, without regard to their responsibility or 
lack thereof for the financial statement in question.”39  Similarly, Professor Fried has 
argued that the “SEC’s proposed Dodd-Frank clawback reaches too many executives,’’ 
since clawing back compensation from executives below the “top 5” “cannot be 
expected to reduce [financial] misreporting.”40  And Professors Bank and Georgiev 
have argued that the Dodd-Frank clawback is overbroad in reaching a “large class of 
executives” and applying “irrespective of whether fraud occurred or who was at 
fault.”41 
 
But these appear to be more criticisms of Congress’s apparent objective in 
enacting the Dodd-Frank clawback than of the clawback design per se.  The reach of 
the Dodd-Frank clawback is reasonable if the goal is to prevent unjust enrichment of 
executives arising from the confluence of incentive pay and accounting restatements.  
And this is an objective that the SEC took seriously.  The SEC cites the Banking 
Committee’s statement of purpose numerous times in its proposed rule making.  For 
example, in justifying mandated pro rata recovery among executives participating in 
“pool plans,” the SEC stated its belief “that permitting [board of director] discretion 
in these instances would be inconsistent with Section 10D’s no-fault standard and its 
goal of preventing executive officers from retaining compensation to which they are 
not entitled under the restated financial reporting measure.”42  
 
Given an objective of avoiding unfairness and unjust enrichment, the SEC’s 
proposal to interpret “executive officer” under § 954 consistently with the definition 
of “executive officer” under Securities Exchange Act § 16, that is to say broadly, rather 
than narrowly limiting the population to “top 5” executives, seems perfectly 
reasonable.43  Such a definition is under inclusive, if anything, as it fails to require 
 
38 Bainbridge, supra note 5 (echoing Professor Roberto Romano’s reference to SOX as “quack 
corporate governance” in Roberta Romano, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Making of Quack Corporate 
Governance, 114 YALE L.J. 1521 (2005)). 
39 Bainbridge, supra note 5, at 1806. 
40 Fried, supra note 5, at 6. 
41 Bank & Georgiev, supra note 5, at 24. 
42 SEC Release, supra note 3, at 74. 
43 Securities Exchange Act § 16(a) requires “executive officers” to register with the SEC and to 
report all trades in equity securities of their issuer.  These individuals are also subject to the “short-
swing” trading rule under § 16(b) that allows for disgorgement on a no-fault basis of profits derived 
by these individuals on trades of company securities within a six-month window.  Section 16 does not 
define “executive officer,” but the term has been interpreted by the SEC, in part, as follows:  “The term 
“officer” shall mean an issuer's president, principal financial officer, principal accounting officer (or, if 
there is no such accounting officer, the controller), any vice-president of the issuer in charge of a 
principal business unit, division or function (such as sales, administration or finance), any other officer 
who performs a policy-making function, or any other person who performs similar policy-making 
functions for the issuer.” Securities Exchange Act Rule 16a-1(f) (17 CFR 240.16a-1(f)). 
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recoupment from non-executive employees who have received inflated 
compensation as a result of financial misreporting, but Congress limited the reach of 
§ 954 to “executive officers,” not all employees, and the SEC must live within that 
constraint.  
 
Given increasing concerns in recent years about growing wealth inequality, 
and particularly growing inequality between the super rich and the merely well off, 
Congress’s focus on unjust enrichment and unfairness in promulgating a mandatory 
clawback of unearned executive pay in Dodd-Frank seems highly prescient.  
Legislators seeking to avoid unjust enrichment of corporate executives might also 
have been motivated by underlying concerns with improving investor confidence in 
U.S. public companies and the security markets more generally.  And these would all 
be plausible goals underlying a mandatory, no-fault clawback provision since 
individual companies would be unlikely to take into account broad public concerns 
such as these in deciding whether or how to enforce discretionary clawback 
policies.44 
 
3. Employer-Initiated Clawbacks 
 
Not surprisingly, the rationales firms provide for adopting clawbacks differ 
somewhat from the rationales of legislators.45  BBBCS report data on reasons stated 
in proxy statements for clawback adoption.  Some are chiefly administrative – the 
clawback was adopted as part of a larger compensation plan (25% of firms) or as part 
of an employment agreement (13%) – but other reasons provided were more 
substantive – to mitigate excessive risk taking (13% of firms).46  Ten percent of firms 
cited SOX as a reason for adopting a clawback provision although SOX does not 
require firms to do so, and another 10% cited Dodd-Frank, suggesting that these firms 
were getting ahead of the curve. 47  A number of firms cited improved corporate 
governance (9%), improved executive/shareholder alignment (4%), or best practices 
(2%) as rationales for adoption.48 
 
Although not explicitly provided as a rationale, a number of firm-initiated 
clawbacks are intended at least in part to enforce contractual agreements.  27% of 
 
44 While endorsing no-fault clawbacks, Professors Murphy and Jensen have argued that boards of 
directors should have more discretion than that provided by the Dodd-Frank provision to determine 
whether to pursue clawbacks.  See Murphy & Jensen, supra note 5, at 41 (noting the difficulty of 
pursuing clawbacks from employees who have paid taxes on compensation).  But in my view, Murphy 
and Jensen underestimate how reticent boards will be to pursue clawbacks absent a mandate.  See 
BBBCS, supra note 4 (providing evidence that boards rarely enforce voluntarily adopted clawback 
policies). 
45  As suggested above, we would not expect companies to focus on systemic issues, such as 
improving investor confidence in the securities markets generally, in deciding whether to voluntarily 
adopt a clawback policy. 
46 BBBCS, supra note 4, at 45 (Table 2, Panel A). 
47 Id.  
48 Id. 
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firms that detailed clawback triggers listed violation of a non-compete as a trigger.49  
Another 16% listed violation of a non-solicitation agreement and 16% listed violation 
of a non-disclosure agreement as clawback triggers.50  The adoption of these “bad-
boy” triggers suggests that preventing these behaviors is a goal of many voluntarily 
adopted clawback policies. 
 
According to BBBCS’s evidence, firms do not expressly state that they are 
adopting clawbacks in an effort to minimize the rewards to and amount of financial 
misreporting or to avoid the unjust enrichment of their executives, but their stated 
rationales are not inconsistent with these justifications either.  It is intriguing that 
13% of firms report mitigating excessive risk taking as a rationale.  This could be an 
oblique reference to “aggressive” financial reporting or could refer to aggressive 
business positions or both.  This point is explored further in the following section.  In 
sum, however, the evidence, such as it is, supports a range of predictable rationales 
for mandating or voluntarily adopting clawbacks including mitigation of financial 
misreporting or excessive risk taking, penalizing contractual breaches, and 
prevention of unjust enrichment. 
 
III.  OPTIMAL CLAWBACK TAXATION 
 
 As we will see momentarily, employee income taxes can consume up to 50% 
of executive compensation.  As a result, the tax treatment of clawed back 
compensation takes on real importance.  This Part will focus on the optimal tax 
treatment of clawbacks from several perspectives and will argue that the optimal 
regime would be one in which any taxes paid on compensation prior to its being 
clawed back would be fully refunded.   
A. Overview of Compensation Taxation: What’s at Stake? 
 The tax consequences of clawbacks can be significant, but they vary depending 
on the type and timing of compensation subject to a clawback obligation.  This section 
provides a general overview of compensation taxation as a prelude to consideration 
of an optimal clawback tax regime. 
 
 Consider this paradigm case.  An executive receives a $1 million cash bonus in 
2019.  The bonus is ordinary income that we will assume is taxed at the current 
maximum federal rate of 37%.51  If the executive works in a high tax state like New 
York or California, she will pay state income tax at rates approaching 10% or more.52 
 
49 Id. at 45 (Table 2, Panel B). 
50 Id. 
51 Pub. L. No. 115-97, 131 Stat. 2054, § 11001 (2017).  This act is colloquially known as the Tax 
Cuts and Jobs Act (TCJA). 
52 The maximum marginal tax rate on personal income in New York is 8.82%. https://www.tax-
brackets.org/newyorktaxtable.  The maximum marginal rate in California is 13.3%.  Id.   
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Medicare tax adds another 2.35% for high-income employees.53  In total, because the 
compensation is ordinary income, the employee tax burden can approach or even 
exceed 50% of the bonus payment. 54   Unless the deduction is barred by IRC § 
162(m),55 the employer should be entitled to deduct the $1 million payment, but the 
point is that the tax dollars at stake are very significant. 
 
 If we substitute a bonus paid in stock worth $1 million, the tax result is exactly 
the same.  The timing of taxation of equity pay is more complex, but when a stock 
grant vests or an option is exercised, the gains generally are taxed to the recipient as 
ordinary income56 and the employer is entitled to an equivalent deduction.57 
 
 Now suppose that the executive is required to return the cash bonus or equity 
compensation in 2020.  If the employer was able to deduct the bonus when paid, it 
will generally be required to include the amount recouped in income and will pay tax 
on that amount.  The employer, in other words, will generally face no net tax 
consequences from having paid and recouped a bonus.  But will the executive be able 
to deduct the repayment or receive a credit for tax paid in 2019?  If not, the executive 
could face a net cost of $500,000 for the privilege of holding $1 million in cash or stock 
worth $1 million for a year.  This critical question is the subject of Part IV.58 
 
 
53 Employees pay a 1.45% Medicare tax on all compensation.  High-income employees pay an 
additional 0.9%.  Social Security Administration, Pub. No. 05-10024, Understanding the Benefits (Jan. 
2020); https://www.ssa.gov/pubs/EN-05-10024.pdf.  Employers also pay 1.45% Medicare tax on all 
wages, and it is generally understood that the incidence of the employer paid Medicare tax falls on 
employees.  Id.  This may or may not be true for executive bonuses, but the taxes executives bear on 
bonuses are very large either way. 
54 Under the TCJA, state taxes are only deductible up to $10,000.  TCJA § 11042.  For a high-income 
executive, the state tax on a bonus would be non-deductible in practice, and thus the federal, state, and 
Medicare rates can be added to generate a combined effective rate.   
55 Prior to the enactment of the TCJA, compensation of a public company’s “top five” executives 
beyond $1 million per executive per year was not deductible unless it was performance based, but the 
cash and equity-based bonuses at issue here could easily have been structured to ensure full 
deductibility.  See IRC § 162(m) (2017).  Today, given the TCJA, public company top five executive pay 
in excess of $1 million per year is not deductible, full stop.  See TCJA § 13601(a). 
56 There are exceptions.  Recipients of restricted stock may make an election under IRC § 83(b) to 
include the value of the stock in income at grant rather than at vesting, but, because the tax paid at 
grant cannot be recovered if the stock fails to vest, §83(b) elections by employees of companies with 
publicly traded stock are rare.  See David I. Walker, Is Equity Compensation Tax Advantaged?, 84 B.U. L. 
REV. 695, 707 (citing interview evidence).  Gains arising from Incentive Stock Options are taxed when 
a recipient sells the underlying shares rather than upon option exercise (see IRC § 421(a)), but 
limitations on the grant of ISOs result in these options being economically insignificant relative to 
“nonqualified” stock options.  See, e.g., Brian J. Hall & Jeffrey B. Liebman, The Taxation of Executive 
Compensation, in 14 TAX POLICY AND THE ECONOMY (2000) (reporting that ISOs account for about 5% of 
compensatory options). 
57 Again, unless the deduction is barred by IRC § 162(m). 
58 Another possibility, considered in Part VI below, is that the company reduces the executive’s 
2020 compensation by $1 million in lieu of requiring the executive to return the 2019 $1 million bonus.  
But it is likely that this technique would have the same tax consequences as explicit repayment. 
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In some instances, however, compensation subject to a clawback may not have 
been taxed in the first instance, eliminating any tax issue upon recoupment.  Suppose, 
for example, that the executive received her $1 million bonus in February, 2019, and 
that the bonus was returned in October, 2019, as a result of an intervening accounting 
restatement.  Assuming that the executive employs the calendar year as her fiscal 
year, this pair of transactions would have no income tax consequences as both 
occurred during the same tax year.59  The combination of transactions would yield a 
“tax nothing.” 
 
Alternatively, suppose that the executive made an election in 2018 to defer 
any cash bonus received in 2019 until retirement under her firm’s nonqualified 
deferred compensation plan.  In this case, the executive would not pay income tax on 
the bonus when earned in 2019, and her employer would not be entitled to a 
deduction in that year. 60   The deferred bonus would normally be taxed to the 
executive and deducted in the year of payment, but if clawed back in 2020 (or at any 
point before payment), there would be no tax consequences arising from the 
transactions; again a tax nothing.61 
 
There are other situations in which incentive compensation would not have 
been taxed prior to being clawed back in a future year.  Suppose a firm awards 
performance shares to their executives under the following terms:  The number of 
shares awarded will be determined based on the firm’s average earnings 
performance over the 2015-2018 period, but the shares awarded will not vest in the 
executives, i.e., become owned outright, until 2021. 62   The executive is awarded 
10,000 shares in 2019 based on reported earnings for the three-year period.  Because 
the shares are unvested, they are not included in income at that time.  In 2020, the 
firm restates earnings for 2017-2018.  Given the downward revision, the executive 
should have received 8,000 shares.  2,000 shares are recouped.  There is no need or 
basis for a tax deduction or credit.  From a tax perspective, this is equivalent to the 
executive having received 8,000 unvested shares to begin with.63 
 
These last two examples are important because they highlight potential 
inequities and dynamic effects arising from the tax rules applicable to clawbacks.  
Most large public companies have elective deferred compensation programs.64  If it 
 
59 Penn v. Robertson, 115 F.2d 167, 175 (4th Cir. 1940) (“rescission” of money received “before 
the close of the calendar year extinguished what otherwise would have been taxable income”).  
60 Robert A. Miller, Nonqualified Deferred Compensation Plans, in EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION 211 
(Yale D. Tauber & Donald R. Levy eds., 2002). 
61 A clawback of deferred compensation may present problems under IRC § 409A.  See infra Part 
VI. 
62 Alternatively, the shares may be designed to vest in 2018 with payout deferred until 2021.  In 
order to defer income tax application until 2021, such a deferral would have to comport with the rules 
of § 409A.  
63 This is essentially the SEC’s example in its proposed rule making.  See SEC Release, supra note 
3, at 54-55. 
64 Approximately three quarters of large companies offer nonqualified deferred compensation 
programs currently. See Doug Frederick & Aaron Pedowitz, Mercer, Market Landscape of Executive 
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turns out that the receipt and repayment of a non-deferred cash bonus results in 
adverse net consequences for an executive, two similarly situated executives could 
face very different clawback tax consequences depending on whether they elect to 
defer bonuses.  Similarly, many companies make performance awards comparable to 
that outlined in the paragraph above but deliver vested (and taxed) shares at the end 
of the three-year performance period.  In this situation, the tax treatment of clawed 
back shares would be important, and that tax treatment might influence the design of 
performance awards. 
 
Now that we have a sense of what’s at stake, we can consider the optimal tax 
treatment of clawed back compensation and then evaluate the current tax rules 
against that benchmark.  But before we do, it will be helpful to briefly consider who 
bears the cost of clawbacks and the taxes on clawed back compensation. 
B.  Clawback and Clawback Tax Incidence 
 Who bears the cost of clawed back compensation and of any net tax obligation 
resulting from the receipt and repayment of clawed back compensation?  Executives 
bear these costs in the first instance, but, as a class, executives are unlikely to 
ultimately bear 100% of these costs.  Under any conception of the executive pay-
setting process, one would expect executives subjected to clawbacks to demand and 
receive compensation for the increased riskiness of their pay. 65   And, indeed, 
empirical evidence indicates that clawback adoption leads to increased compensation 
for executives. 66   Moreover, presumably, executives would demand to be 
compensated for incurring net tax obligations on compensation they are forced to 
disgorge, shifting at least part of the tax burden onto shareholders. 
 
 
Benefit Programs 2 (2016) (reporting that 73% of Fortune 500 companies offered nonqualified 
savings plans in 2015); The Newport Grp., Executive Benefits: A Survey of Current Trends 13 
(2014/2015 ed.) (noting that 72% of Fortune 1000 companies offered a nonqualified savings plan in 
2013). 
65 The two leading, non-mutually exclusive, theories of the executive pay-setting process are the 
optimal contracting theory and the rent extraction theory.  The optimal contracting view posits that 
executive pay arrangements are selected to minimize managerial agency costs and maximize 
shareholder value.  See John E. Core et al., Executive Equity Compensation and Incentives: A Survey, 9 
ECON. POL’Y REV. 27, 27-28 (2003).  The managerial power view posits that executive pay arrangements 
reflect agency costs, as well as combat them, and that compensation design is not consistent with 
shareholder value maximization. Under this view, the threat or reality of investor and financial press 
outrage plays an important role in disciplining compensation, and, as a result, executives and directors 
seek out low salience channels of pay and other means of camouflaging compensation to minimize 
outrage.  See Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Jesse M. Fried & David I. Walker, Managerial Power and Rent 
Extraction in the Design of Executive Compensation, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 751, 789 (2002).   
66  See BBBCS, supra note 4, Internet Appendix, at 1-2 (finding that clawback adoption at S&P 1500 
companies leads to an average increase in aggregate top 5 executive pay of more than $300,000 per 
year).   
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 Thus, companies and their shareholders should expect to bear a significant 
portion of these costs.67  And so, the tax treatment of clawback payments isn’t just a 
concern for executives; it’s a concern for investors generally.68   
 
 This is not to suggest, however, that the cost of clawed back compensation or 
a net tax liability following a particular clawback event would be passed on to 
shareholders dollar for dollar.  The idea here is that executives are likely to be 
compensated on an expected cost basis for the risk of a clawback being imposed, but 
once a clawback is imposed, the costs likely remain with the executives.  Of course, it 
is possible that a sympathetic board or compensation committee might boost 
executive pay following a particular clawback event, but if the clawback is significant 
it would be difficult to make the executives whole for clawed back compensation 
without incurring the wrath of investors.69  
 
It is somewhat more plausible that companies would reimburse or “gross up” 
executives for net tax liabilities resulting from particular clawback events.  Although 
tax gross ups are extremely expensive and strongly discouraged today by proxy 
advisory firms and other investor advocates, companies historically have made 
executives whole for taxes imposed with respect to various transactions and perks.70  
This possibility is further explored in the next Part.  But to the extent that executives 
are compensated ex ante for net tax costs and not grossed up ex post, any adverse tax 
treatment of clawed back compensation not only imposes costs on shareholders, it 
also may result in differential treatment of similarly situated executives, as discussed 
above, and, as discussed below, in excessive reduction of risk and/or distortions to 
clawback program design and implementation of executive pay practices more 
generally. 
C. The Optimal Tax Treatment of Clawed Back Compensation  
 
67 These costs may well be justified if they reduce overall agency costs, just as the cost of the 
external audit function may be justified. 
68 Labor may bear part of the burden, as well.  See David I. Walker, Who Bears the Cost of Excessive 
Executive Compensation (and Other Corporate Agency Costs)?, 57 VILL. L. REV. 653, 54 (2012) (arguing 
that like corporate income taxes, managerial agency costs are likely borne in part by suppliers of 
capital and in part by labor). 
69 Suppose, for example, that an executive estimates that there is a one in twenty chance, per year, 
of a clawback-triggering event that would result in her being required to return $2 million in comp.  
The executive might seek $100,000 per year additional compensation to offset this risk.  Assume that 
the board boosts her pay by this amount.  Now suppose that a triggering event does occur in 2020 and 
the executive returns $2 million.  Presumably, she would bear much or all of this cost as shareholders 
have already paid for this ex ante and because a $2 million added bonus to cover the clawback would 
be difficult to hide or justify. 
70 See infra Part III.C.3.  Tax gross ups are expensive because the payments to cover tax obligations 
are also taxable income, requiring further taxable payments.  At a 50% combined state and federal 
income tax rate, a company would need to pay an executive $1 million to fully reimburse her for a 
$500,000 tax obligation.  Id. 
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 This section considers the optimal tax treatment of repaid compensation in 
light of the various rationales for clawback mandates or their voluntary adoption.  It 
takes into account the fact that clawbacks and the tax treatment of clawback 
payments have dynamic effects, and that company boards have discretion in the 
adoption and implementation of clawbacks and in compensation design, and that tax 
rules applicable to clawbacks will impact the use of that discretion.  It assumes in the 
first instance that executives bear the net tax costs of particular clawback events, but 
also reconsiders the picture if taxes are grossed up.  Ultimately, I conclude that 
compensation that is paid and subsequently clawed back ideally should result in zero 
net tax consequence for executives and employers. 
 
1. Clawback Rationales and Tax 
 
As discussed above, clawback provisions might be mandated or voluntarily 
adopted in an effort to deter financial misreporting or excessive risk taking, to 
encourage compliance with non-compete and other agreements, or to prevent unjust 
enrichment.  Given that up to 50% of executive bonuses can be consumed by taxes, 
the tax treatment of clawback payments can play an important role in facilitating or 
undermining the achievement of these goals.  In theory, that tax treatment could 
range from complete offset of any taxes paid on the recouped compensation, to no 
offset, or to something in between. 
 
a. Prevention of Unjust Enrichment 
 
 Let us begin where the answer is clearest: no-fault clawbacks of excess 
compensation intended to prevent unjust enrichment of executives.  I’ve argued that 
the legislative history and the structural details of the Dodd-Frank clawback are 
consistent with an unjust enrichment rationale.71  Under this conception, executives 
should receive and retain exactly what they were promised, no more and no less, but 
the determination of what is owed to an executive should be based on full and correct 
information, including any restated financial data.  Tax treatment of clawback 
payments that perfectly offsets the taxation of any prior inclusion is, I believe, most 
consistent with an objective of avoiding unjust enrichment. 
 
 In its proposed rule making under Dodd-Frank, the SEC went to some length 
to define and describe how clawback policies should be designed in order to ensure 
repayment of “the amount of incentive-based compensation received by the executive 
officer or former executive officer that exceeds the amount of incentive-based 
compensation that otherwise would have been received had it been determined 
based on the accounting restatement.” 72   This is no small task, particularly for 
incentive compensation that is awarded based on a firm’s artificially inflated share 
 
71 Supra Part II.C.2. 
72 SEC Proposed Rule 10D-1(b)(1)(iii). 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3773046
 Clawback Taxation  
 19 
price that exists prior to a restatement.73  It would be much easier to simply require 
recoupment of all incentive pay received within some window of a restatement, a la 
the SOX clawback.   The fact that the Dodd-Frank clawback and many firm-initiated 
clawback policies are predicated on recoupment of excess compensation, rather than 
all incentive compensation associated with a triggering event, suggests a focus less 
on punishment than on getting to the right level of compensation.   
The SEC’s proposed rule also specifies that the determination of excess 
compensation is to be made “pre-tax,” that is, calculated without regard to any tax 
paid, 74  in order to ensure full recovery by the employer and to reduce the 
administrative burden of determining after-tax amounts received by various 
executives.  This makes sense.  Recovery of excess compensation on a pre-tax basis 
makes the shareholders whole. 75   Assuming no significant change in tax rates, a 
company’s earlier deduction for compensation paid, if any, will be offset by the 
inclusion of compensation recouped.  So a company applying the SEC’s proposed rule 
generally would be made whole, ex post, both before and after tax. 76    
Pre-tax recovery of excess compensation also ensures that the executives 
subject to the clawback are not unjustly enriched pre-tax.  However, unless 
repayment results in an exact offset of any taxes paid as a result of the earlier 
inclusion, the executives may be unjustly enriched after tax (if repayment reduces an 
executive’s taxes more than the prior inclusion increased them) or, more likely, 
penalized after-tax (if repayment reduces taxes less than the prior inclusion 
increased them).77   
b. Reducing Financial Misreporting and “Bad Boy” Behaviors 
 
  The SOX clawback seems designed to deter financial misreporting by reducing 
the expected profit associated with that activity.  I’ve referred to this clawback as a 
 
73 Fried argues that these are “guesstimates,” but this characterization seems extreme.  Fried, 
supra note 5, at 52-54.  Presumably, event studies generally can be used to estimate the impact of faulty 
financials on share price.  Event studies are inexact but are widely used in securities litigation.  See 
generally Jill E. Fisch et. al., The Logic and Limits of Event Studies in Securities Fraud Litigation, 96 Tex. 
L. REV. 553 (2018).   In its proposed rulemaking, the SEC discussed the potential use of event studies 
to determine excess compensation arising from restatements and also highlighted the difficulties.  The 
SEC will not mandate the use of event studies but plans to “permit an issuer to use any reasonable 
estimate of the effect of the restatement on stock price and TSR.”  SEC Release, supra note 3, at 127. 
74 SEC Proposed Rule 10D-1(b)(1)(iii). 
75 That is, recovery makes the shareholders whole on an ex post basis.  Investors may pay for 
expected clawbacks ex ante through greater compensation. 
76 If a deduction was allowed to the employer at the time of payment, the amount recovered will 
be included in income when recouped.  If a deduction was not allowed per § 162(m), there will be no 
inclusion upon recoupment.  IRC § 111.  Either way, shareholders will be kept whole, ex post, pre- and 
post-tax. 
77 As discussed supra Part III.B., I assume in Parts III.C.1&2 that investors bear part of the cost of 
clawbacks and any adverse tax treatment of clawbacks on an ex ante basis, but that executives bear 
the cost of particular clawback events.  Another possibility, discussed in Part III.C.3, is that companies 
gross up executives for the adverse tax consequences of clawbacks. 
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sledgehammer given that it contemplates the recovery by an employer of all incentive 
pay, not just excess pay, associated with triggering restatements as well as recovery 
of share sale profits, not just “excess” profits.78  Congress apparently wasn’t worried 
about over-deterrence when it adopted this clawback approach. 
 
Assuming that there is no real risk of over-deterrence, a clawback tax regime 
providing for full tax offsets, no tax offsets, or anything in between would be 
consistent with deterrence of financial misreporting.  But is it really appropriate to 
ignore over-deterrence?  In this case, it probably is.  To the extent that the SOX 
clawback is only invoked in cases of purposeful financial misreporting, the risk of 
over-deterrence should be small.  The ideal amount of purposeful financial 
misreporting is zero.  Similarly, to the extent that companies have adopted “bad boy” 
clawback provisions to deter executives from violating non-competition, non-
solicitation, or non-disclosure agreements, and companies are not concerned about 
over-deterrence, these objectives also are supported by any tax treatment of paid and 
recouped compensation that is on net neutral or worse than neutral.  
 
c. Mitigating Excess Risk-Taking Incentives 
 
 The evidence collected by BBBCS suggests that employer-initiated clawback 
policies differ substantially from those specified by SOX and Dodd-Frank.79  They find 
that voluntary clawback adoption is associated with a reduction in risk taking, and 
that the reduction does not relate purely to financial risk, but also to investment 
risk. 80  As they note, clawbacks can mitigate imprudent risk taking, but can also 
reduce prudent risk taking.  They find, however, that stock market reaction to 
clawback adoption is generally positive, suggesting that the market believes, on 
average, that the reductions in risk taking induced by clawback adoption are value 
increasing.81 
 
 To the extent that risk management is an objective of clawback adoption, the 
tax treatment of recoupments again becomes important, particularly in a world in 
which income taxes can consume 50% of incentive pay.  There is a real concern that 
prudent risk taking could be inefficiently inhibited if the expected after-tax financial 
penalty associated with a clawback triggering event is too high.  Moreover, because 
incentive pay may or may not have been taxed prior to a clawback, balancing these 
incentives would be quite difficult under a tax regime that did not allow for full 
recovery of taxes paid on compensation received that is subsequently recouped.  
Doing so is much more straightforward with full tax offsets. 
 
 
78 Supra Part II.C.1. 
79 Supra Part II.C.3. 
80 BBBCS, supra note 4, at 2. 
81 BBBCS theorize that clawback adoption can be value enhancing as it may solve a horizon 
problem that relates to the timing mismatch between current managerial action and future observable 
consequences.   BBBCS, supra note 4, at 9.  
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Consider the following example.  A company’s board of directors is concerned 
about risk taking and attempts to balance incentive pay, which creates risk taking 
incentives, with clawback policies, that mitigate excessive risk taking by permitting 
ex post review of decision making.  The compensation committee determines that the 
following scheme best aligns its VP’s risk-taking incentives with shareholder 
interests:  a bonus of 0 to $5 million (after-tax) based on three-year total shareholder 
return relative to a peer group of firms with a no-fault clawback of any un-earned 
compensation.  The company also has an elective deferred compensation program in 
which Valerie VP participates, but Victor VP does not.  At a 50% tax rate, the 
committee can accomplish its intended result with respect to both Valerie and Victor 
by providing a 0 to $10 million pre-tax bonus, if, but only if, full tax offsets are 
provided for any clawed back compensation.  Suppose, for example, that faulty 
financials result in payment of the maximum $10 million bonus in 2019, but that 
restated financials produced in 2020 support only an $8 million bonus.  Valerie 
deferred her bonus and has not yet paid tax.  She returns $2 million to company and 
is left with $8 million pre-tax and ultimately $4 million after tax is paid on the bonus 
at the end of the deferral period.  Victor paid $5 million tax on receipt of his bonus.  
With full tax offsets, Victor would receive a $1 million tax refund when he returns $2 
million to Company, also leaving him with $4 million after tax.  If no tax offsets are 
allowed for recouped compensation, however, Valerie would still net $4 million, but 
Victor would net only $3 million.  
 
To be sure, I am somewhat skeptical that firms manage risk-taking incentives 
in precisely this fashion, but the upshot is the same: full offset of previously paid taxes 
is most consistent with facilitating a risk management clawback objective. 
 
2. Fairness, Dynamics Responses, and Other Considerations 
 
 While allowing full offset of employee tax previously paid on clawed back 
compensation is consistent with the various rationales for clawback imposition or 
voluntary adoption, it is most strongly dictated by an objective of avoiding unjust 
enrichment of, but not penalizing, executives who receive excess pay as a result of 
misreported financials.  Once other considerations are taken into account, however, 




 Fairness in taxation is a big, contested issue.82  Here, I will focus solely on two 




82 See Brian Galle, Tax Fairness, 65 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1323, 1324 (noting that “the concept of tax 
fairness is presently in some disrepute” in academic tax circles).  There is agreement that as a society 
we “should care about distributive justice,” but not much agreement beyond that.  Id. 
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Horizontal equity requires equal taxation of similarly situated taxpayers.83  
This too is a contested concept,84 but I have in mind only the desirability of applying 
consistent taxation to individuals engaged in economically indistinguishable 
transactions, an intuitive horizontal equity, if you will.85  Unless “similarly situated” 
is defined very narrowly, equal taxation of similarly situated executives subject to a 
clawback can only be assured under a tax regime that provides for full offset of 
previously incurred tax on recouped compensation.  Again, the easiest way to see this 
is to compare the situation of our two executives who are forced to repay 
compensation – Valerie and Victor – and who are identical in every way except that 
Valerie has elected to defer her bonus (and the tax on that bonus) until retirement 
while Victor has not made that election and has paid tax currently.  In a full tax offset 
regime, Valerie’s repayment will have no tax consequence, since her bonus was not 
previously taxed, while Victor will receive a deduction or credit offsetting his prior 
tax obligation on the recouped amount.  On net, they will face the same tax on the 
same post-clawback income.  Under a regime providing for no deduction or credit for 
previously incurred tax, Valerie would still face no net tax as a result of the bonus 
award and recoupment while Victor would incur a net tax obligation of up to 50% of 
the recouped bonus.86 
 
One can also think of fairness in this context as avoiding financial punishment 
via clawbacks of executives who played no part in activities leading to earnings 
restatements.  Under an unjust enrichment perspective, these executives should not 
profit from the misreported results, but they should not be penalized either.  Under 
this view, the case for full tax offsets seems particularly compelling in the context of 
no-fault clawbacks enforced against executives with no involvement in particular 
misreporting and no overall responsibility for a company’s financial reporting – for 
example, a vice president of research and development at a firm that has misreported 
sales.  Under the Dodd-Frank approach, only excess compensation is recovered from 
these executives, which intuitively seems fair.  However, without full tax offsets, the 
executives could face a net tax obligation of up to 50% on compensation that was 
received and repaid, which seems intuitively unfair.87   
 
83 Id. at 1325 (citing R. A. Musgrave, In Defense of an Income Concept, 81 HARV. L. REV. 44, 45 
(1967).  
84 Galle, supra note 82, at 1324-25 (discussing critiques of the horizontal equity principle pressed 
by Louis Kaplow, Liam Murphy and Thomas Nagel, and others). 
85 As Galle notes, despite the persuasive academic critiques of horizontal equity, the concept 
continues to exhibit an intuitive and lasting appeal (citing Richard A. Musgrave, Horizontal Equity: A 
Further Note, 1 FLA. TAX. REV. 354, 358 (1993). 
86  Here, again, I am assuming that executives bear whatever net tax flows from a particular 
clawback event.  This may not be the case.  See infra Part III.C.3. 
87 The equities in this situation remind one of Burnet v. Sanford & Brooks Co., 282 U.S. 359 (1931).  
There, the taxpayer incurred deductible expenses between 1913 and 1916 that exceeded gross 
income.  Subsequently, the taxpayer collected a judgment related specifically to the prior expenses.  
The taxpayer argued that the earlier losses and subsequent recovery should be netted to determine 
taxable income.  The Supreme Court held that such a result was inconsistent with annual tax 
accounting.  Of course, Congress responded to the inherent unfairness of situations like that in Sanford 
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b. Adoption and Implementation of Clawback Regimes 
 
 In the absence of final rule making under Dodd-Frank, the adoption and 
implementation of clawback policies is largely at the discretion of company boards of 
directors.  To be sure, the SEC has the power to pursue clawbacks against CEOs and 
CFOs under SOX, and the SEC has in recent years become more aggressive in doing 
so,88 but even so, SOX clawbacks are largely confined to the most egregious cases.  The 
proxy advisory services place some pressure on firms to voluntarily adopt clawbacks, 
but the compensation “scorecard” promulgated by Institutional Shareholder Services, 
the largest proxy advisory firm, asks only whether a company maintains a “sufficient” 
or “rigorous” clawback policy; it does not prescribe best practices for clawback design 
or implementation.89  If we want firms to adopt comprehensive clawback policies and 
to implement them aggressively, or at least even-handedly, the tax treatment of 
recouped compensation matters. 
 
  Imagine the worst-case clawback tax scenario, from the point of view of 
companies and their executives, in which compensation is taxed to the executives 
when received, but is not deductible or creditable for the executives when recouped.  
Assuming, reasonably, that the tax treatment of an employer that recoups 
compensation will be neutral,90 this tax treatment of the executives would impose a 
joint employer/employee tax burden on recouped compensation, and that has several 
pernicious effects.91 
 
 As discussed above, the net cost associated with such a tax regime is unlikely 
to be borne solely by the executives.  Executives subjected to such a regime would 
demand greater compensation to offset the risk of incurring net tax obligations on 
compensation they cannot keep, shifting at least part of the tax burden onto 
shareholders.  But however the net burden is borne in aggregate, a tax regime that 
fails to provide for full tax offsets for disgorged compensation will discourage the 
voluntary adoption of clawback policies and discourage the adoption of more 
comprehensive, no-fault policies by adopting companies.92 
 
& Brooks by providing for net operating loss deductions.  See IRC § 172.  Providing full tax offsets for 
clawback payments would reflect a similar spirit. 
88 See supra note 16 and accompanying text. 
89  See ISS, United States Proxy Voting Guidelines (Dec. 6, 2018), 
https://www.issgovernance.com/file/policy/active/americas/US-Voting-Guidelines.pdf.   
90 Recouped compensation will be included in the employer’s income only if and to the extent that 
the compensation was previously deducted by the employer and the deduction reduced the employer’s 
taxes.  IRC § 111. 
91 As Myron Scholes and Mark Wolfson have repeatedly emphasized, the analyst must consider 
all taxes, all parties, and all costs in evaluating the tax consequences of various rules or transactions.  
See Myron S. Scholes & Mark A. Wolfson, Taxes and Employee Compensation Planning, TAXES (Dec. 
1986); MYRON S. SCHOLES ET AL, TAXES AND BUSINESS STRATEGY: A PLANNING APPROACH 183 (2d ed. 2002). 
92 Similarly, to the extent that executives have discretion as to whether to restate earnings, the 
imposition of a restatement-triggered clawback will tend to discourage restatement filings, and 
asymmetric tax treatment of clawbacks will further discourage such filings.  See Fried, supra note 5, at 
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 Moreover, to the extent that companies have discretion with respect to 
implementation within mandated clawback regimes or their own voluntarily adopted 
policies, boards or compensation committees are likely to use that discretion to 
minimize the scope of executive clawback obligations in the worst case, no tax offset 
scenario. 
 
 A tax regime that provides for full tax offsets for recouped compensation 
would not impose an additional, external cost onto clawback programs.  To be sure, 
executives will still demand to be compensated for the risk of losing compensation 
due to a clawback, and, in particular, due to a no-fault clawback triggered by another 
executive’s error or malfeasance, but taxes would not add to the possible losses under 
a full offset tax regime. 
 
c. Impact on Compensation Design 
 
 We should also consider the impact of clawback policies, and the taxation of 
clawbacks, on executive compensation design, which is certainly subject to board of 
director/compensation committee discretion.  The interactions are complex, but the 
bottom line is the same: full tax offsets will ensure that the tax treatment of clawbacks 
does not in itself distort compensation design. 
  
 Taxes aside, the existence of a clawback provision, whether mandated or 
voluntarily adopted, is likely to impact compensation design, and perhaps in 
unpredictable ways.  Professors Roberta Romano, Sanjai Bhagat, and Stephen 
Bainbridge have argued that the imposition of clawbacks on incentive compensation 
likely results in firms shifting away from incentive compensation in favor of greater 
salaries.93  BBBCS find, however, that firm-initiated clawback policies are associated 
with more equity-based incentive pay and more pay overall. 94   One possible 
explanation for the former association is that equity pay awards increase the 
incentive for managers to manipulate financials in order to increase equity 
compensation payouts and that clawbacks offset that incentive to some extent by 
imposing an ex post correction when and if such manipulation is uncovered.  Equity 
pay is more attractive from the shareholders’ perspective if manipulation can be 
 
15 (discussing a case in which management’s refusal to file a restatement precluded the application of 
a SOX clawback provision). 
93 See Bainbridge, supra note 5, at 1807 (noting that companies reduced incentive compensation 
and increased executive salaries in response to the SOX clawback and implying that the response to 
the Dodd-Frank clawback could be similar); Bhagat & Romano, supra note 5, at 366 (reporting that 
SOX clawbacks led to a decrease in executive incentive compensation and an increase in salaries).  
Professors Fried and Shilon note that the evidence that Bainbridge, Bhagat, and Romano reference was 
based on the punitive SOX clawback and that excess pay clawbacks, such as the Dodd-Frank clawback, 
“should not distort pay arrangements.”  Fried & Shilon, supra note 5, at 747. 
94 BBBCS, supra note 4, online appendix at 2-3.   
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mitigated, and so clawback adoption is associated with more equity pay, or so this 
story goes.95    
 
 Notably, the SEC’s proposed clawback rules under Dodd-Frank reach some 
forms of incentive pay but not others.  The SEC’s Dodd-Frank clawback rules would 
include stock and options that vest based on satisfaction of a financial reporting goal 
but would not reach simple time-vested stock and options.96  The trend in executive 
pay design over the last two decades has involved a shift away from the latter and 
towards the former, 97  but adoption of a mandatory, no-fault clawback rule that 
incorporates this distinction could potentially reverse this trend.  In my view, this 
would mark an unfortunate return to less performance sensitive executive 
compensation. 
 
 Limited deductibility of clawback payments that increases the cost to 
executives (and indirectly to companies) of recouped pay could reinforce the shift in 
favor of increased performance-based pay observed by BBBCS or it could encourage 
companies to shift away from compensation subject to clawbacks, particularly under 
a mandatory, no-fault Dodd-Frank clawback regime.  It is impossible to predict, but 
what we can say with confidence is that a clawback tax regime that allows for full 
offset of previously paid tax would not exacerbate any distortions in compensation 
design that result from the adoption of clawback rules per se.   
 
Of course, a more direct response to limited deductibility of clawback 
payments would be to design compensation so that it is not taxed to recipients until 
after the potential clawback window has closed, thereby obviating any concern with 
the offset of previously paid taxes.98  Recall the earlier example of shares awarded 
based on 2015-2018 performance that do not vest until 2021.  These shares would 
not be taxed until 2021 and any restatement of 2015-2018 financials is more likely 
than not to have occurred prior to that date.99  Alternatively, limited deductibility 
 
95 Id.  Another possibility noted by BBBCS is that to the extent that clawback adoption reduces 
executive risk taking, it may be in the shareholders’ interest to increase equity pay to maintain risk-
taking incentives.  Id. at 3.   
96 See SEC Release, supra note 3, at 47. 
97  David I. Walker, The Way We Pay Now: Understanding and Evaluating Performance-Based 
Executive Pay, 1 J.L. FIN. & ACCT. 395, 405-08 (2016). 
98 Another possibility might be for the company to reduce executive pay in a subsequent year by 
the amount of the clawback in lieu of requiring an executive to repay the clawback amount.  One might 
expect this approach to eliminate any adverse tax consequences associated with actual repayment, but 
this is unlikely to be true.  See infra Part VI.B. 
99 Studies of restatements reveal that most occur within a half-year of the end of the period of 
misreporting and that the median period of misreporting is between 1.75 and 2.75 years.  See Mark 
Hirschey et al, The Timeliness of Restatement Disclosures and Financial Reporting Credibility, 42 J. BUS. 
FIN. & ACCT. 826, 841 (2015) (examining 348 restatements by U.S. companies between 1997 and 2006 
and finding a 2.75 year median length of the restated period (3 years at the 75th percentile) and a 0.4 
year median delay between the end of the misreported period and restatement (0.6 years at the 75th 
percentile); Linda A. Myers et al, Restating Under the Radar? Determinants of Restatement Disclosure 
Choices and the Related Market Reactions (working paper, April 2013) (examining 1773 restatements 
by U.S. companies between 2002 and 2008 and finding a 1.75 year median length of the restated period 
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might encourage greater elective deferral of incentive compensation into 
nonqualified deferred compensation plans, reducing the amount of previously taxed 
compensation subject to being clawed back.100  Although these would be distortions 
induced by limited deductibility, they are not necessarily “bad” distortions.  Increased 
vesting periods for incentive pay and increased deferred compensation both improve 
long-term alignment between executives and shareholders.  But other distortions 
might be more subtle and pernicious. 
 
3.  The Impact of Tax Gross Ups on the Optimal Tax Treatment of Clawbacks 
 
 Thus far I have assumed that if executives are compensated for net tax costs 
associated with clawed back compensation, they are compensated ex ante based on 
the expected net costs, and that the executives bear any tax costs associated with 
particular clawback events.  The ideal tax treatment of clawed back compensation in 
this scenario would provide for full offset of any taxes previously paid on the amount 
disgorged.  Anything less than full offset results in costs that will be passed on to 
investors ex ante and is inconsistent with an unjust enrichment rationale for 
clawback adoption ex post.  Full offset of taxes on clawed back funds also facilitates 
the use of clawbacks to manage risk taking incentives, ensures equal tax treatment of 
similarly situated executives, best promotes the adoption and robust enforcement of 
voluntary clawback programs, and minimizes distortions in executive pay design.   
 
 But what if executives are made whole or “grossed up” for any net tax cost 
associated with clawed back compensation?  Companies have at times grossed up 
executives for taxes on golden parachute payments, the value of personal use of 
company aircraft, and other perks.101  These gross ups are very expensive, and the 
proxy advisory firms discourage their use,102 but they persist.  One could imagine, in 
particular, companies grossing up executives for taxes on clawed back compensation 
that are not offset on repayment, particularly in the case of no-fault clawbacks 
imposed on executives lacking any culpability.   
 
To be clear, I am not talking about grossing up executives for the clawback 
itself.  That would be pointless.  The whole idea to clawbacks is to ensure that the 
executives receive the “right” amount of compensation pre-tax.  But by the same 
token, these executives arguably should not bear a net tax burden on compensation 
 
(3 years at the 75th percentile) and a 0.5 year median delay between the end of the misreported period 
and restatement (0.6 years at the 75th percentile). 
100 This possibility is considered at greater depth infra Part VI.A. 
101  See, e.g., David Yermack, Flights of Fancy: Corporate Jets, CEO Perquisites, and Inferior 
Shareholder Returns, 80 J. FIN. ECON. 211 (2006) (noting tax gross ups on personal use of corporate 
aircraft); David I. Walker, Tax Incentives Will Not Close Stock Option Accounting Gap, 96 TAX NOTES 851, 
855 (2002) (discussing gross ups for taxes on excess golden parachute payments). 
102 Institutional Shareholder Services, United States Proxy Voting Guidelines 41 (Nov. 18, 2019) 
(listing tax gross-ups as a “problematic” pay practice); Glass Lewis, An Overview of the Glass Lewis 
Approach to Proxy Advice 38 (2019) (voicing opposition to the adoption of new executive excise tax 
gross-ups). 
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that is returned, and tax gross ups would achieve this.  Indeed, a system in which tax 
gross ups were regularly provided to executives for net taxes on clawed back 
compensation would eliminate several of the problems or inequities associated with 
an asymmetric tax regime discussed above.  Gross ups of net clawback taxes would 
facilitate the balancing of risk-taking incentives, ensure equal treatment of executives 
irrespective of their participation in deferred compensation programs, and avoid 
punishing innocent executives required to return compensation.103 
 
But gross ups would not remedy all of the ills associated with net tax costs on 
clawbacks; some it would exacerbate by increasing the total cost of clawbacks for 
companies and their executives.  If clawbacks resulted in net tax costs and gross ups 
were anticipated, companies would be further discouraged from voluntarily adopting 
or even-handedly enforcing clawback provisions and clawbacks would have an even 
larger distortionary impact on the design of executive compensation programs.   
 
How expensive are gross ups?  To get a sense of the cost, consider the example 
of an executive who receives a $1 million bonus in 2019 and pays $500,000 in federal 
and state income taxes.  (To keep the math simple, we will ignore FICA taxes, which 
would be recovered on repayment.)104  Suppose the bonus is clawed back in 2020 and 
that there is no tax credit or deduction for the repayment, such that there is a 
$500,000 net tax burden on zero net compensation.  Suppose the company commits 
to making their executives whole for taxes on clawbacks.  Because these gross up 
payments also are taxable as ordinary income, at, we will again assume, a 50% rate, 
the company will need to pay the executive $1 million to keep her whole after-tax,105 
an incredible cost for issuing and recouping a $1 million bonus. 
 
 And so, despite the fact that tax gross ups might “solve” several problems 
associated with a tax regime that does not provide full offset for taxes paid on clawed 
back compensation, in fact, the possibility that companies might gross up executives 
for these taxes and incur these costs is actually a compelling argument in favor of full 
tax offsets for clawbacks.   
  
IV.  ACTUAL TAX TREATMENT OF CLAWED BACK COMPENSATION 
 
 As this Part explores, the actual tax treatment of clawed back compensation 
does not necessarily align with the full offset ideal.  Although repayments are 
generally deductible as ordinary and necessary business expenses or as business 
 
103 The basic idea here is that fully grossing up executives on any net tax obligations arising from 
clawbacks is equivalent, from the executives’ perspective, to a tax regime providing full offsets.  Thus, 
a number of the benefits associated with a full tax offset regime carry over to a gross up regime.  For 
example, an innocent executive forced to disgorge a bonus under a no-fault clawback provision will be 
made whole after-tax if her previously paid taxes on the compensation are fully refunded or if her 
employer grosses her up on any net tax obligation arising from asymmetric tax treatment. 
104 See infra note 106. 
105 Fifty percent of the $1 million gross up payment will be consumed by tax, leaving $500,000 
after tax to offset the $500,000 net employee tax burden of the clawback. 
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losses, these deductions are of limited direct use (historically) or no direct use 
(currently).  IRC § 1341 may provide for recovery of taxes previously incurred on 
clawed back pay in many situations, but § 1341 relief is imperfect and potentially 
subject to adverse IRS interpretation.   
A. Deductibility under IRC §§ 162/165 
 Let us begin with the paradigm case of an executive who receives 
compensation in an earlier year in accordance with a bonus plan, but who is required 
to repay and does repay that compensation in a later year when it is determined, due 
to an earnings restatement, that the bonus was not actually earned.  Under the well-
settled “claim of right” doctrine, the executive may not amend her federal income tax 
return for the earlier year and exclude the repaid compensation, even if the period 
for amendment remains open, since in the earlier year, the taxpayer had an apparent 
unrestricted right to the compensation.106   
 
However, the taxpayer may be entitled to a deduction in the year of 
repayment.  It is well established that employment constitutes a trade or business, 
such that ordinary and necessary expenses arising from employment are deductible 
under IRC § 162. 107   Both court opinions and IRS memoranda have supported 
deduction of involuntarily repaid compensation in the year of repayment as an 
unreimbursed business expense under § 162 or as a trade or business loss deductible 
under § 165(c).108   
 
Clawback payments should be deductible under §§ 162 or 165 even in 
circumstances in which the taxpayer’s malfeasance triggered the need for the 
earnings restatement and clawed back compensation.  This situation is analogous to 
one in which an embezzler is apprehended and repays stolen funds.  It is well 
established that an embezzler is entitled to deduct repayment, despite the obvious 
malfeasance. 109   Moreover, clawback payments arising from breach of non-
 
106 U.S. v. Lewis, 340 U.S. 590 (1951) (citing North American Oil v. Burnet, 286 U.S. 417 (1932)).  
The facts of Lewis mirror the typical clawback scenario.  Lewis received a $22,000 bonus in 1944 and 
paid tax on that amount.  In 1946, Lewis was ordered by a state court to return $11,000 to his employer 
after it was determined that the original bonus amount had been improperly computed.  Lewis sued 
for a refund, which the Court of Claims allowed.  The Supreme Court reversed. 
The claim of right doctrine does not apply to FICA taxes, which when overpaid in a previous year 
as the result of a clawback provision or otherwise, can be recovered per IRC § 6413 and the regulations 
thereunder. There is a three-year statute of limitations.  See Rev. Rul. 79-311 (holding that § 6413 
provides relief for a taxpayer who was required to return compensation advanced in a previous year 
that exceeded earned commissions); see also, Barker & O’Brien, supra note 5, at 441. 
107 Rev. Rul. 79-311, 1979-2 C.B. 25. 
108  Oswald v. Commissioner, 49 T.C. 645 (1968) (compulsory repayment of excessive 
compensation pursuant to pre-existing bylaw was deductible as an ordinary and business expense); 
Rev. Rul. 82-178, 1982-2 C.B. 59 (repaid “income aid payment” was deductible by employee as a 
business loss per § 165(c)(1)).  
109 McKinney v. U.S., 574 F.2d 1240 (5th Cir. 1978) (noting that the government did not dispute 
the taxpayer’s deduction of embezzled fund in the year of repayment). 
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competition, solicitation, or confidentiality agreements are deductible.110  The only 
circumstance in which a clawback payment would not be deductible under 
§§ 162/165 would be one in which the payment was deemed voluntary, such as a case 
in which the parties entered into the clawback agreement after the triggering 
event.111  Involuntary clawback payments should generally be deductible under §§ 
162/165.    
 
While deductible, the difficulty for executives faced with clawback obligations 
is that unreimbursed employee business expenses under § 162 and trade or business 
losses of individuals per § 165(c)(1) are deductible only as miscellaneous itemized 
deductions (MIDs). 112   Prior to 2018, these deductions were allowed, but were 
restricted; beginning in 2018 and through 2025, these deductions are completely 
disallowed.113  Luckily, for executives facing clawback obligations, § 1341 will often 
provide an alternative path to deduction.  But before turning to that provision, I will 
briefly explore the limitations on deductibility of MIDs that applied prior to 2018 and 
that would potentially apply after 2025. 
 
Prior to 2018, there were three provisions that potentially limited the 
usefulness of MIDs.  First, under § 67, MIDs were allowed only to the extent that the 
sum of MIDs exceeded 2% of AGI.114  To get a sense of the significance of this “haircut”, 
I reviewed the data on the deductibility of MIDs for high-income taxpayers as 
compiled in the IRS’s 2016 Statistics of Income.115  18% of returns reporting AGI 
between $2 and $5 million reported MIDs in excess of the 2% of AGI threshold.116  
While these taxpayers would have faced no § 67 “haircut” on an additional deduction 
for clawed back compensation, the other 82% of taxpayers would have faced a haircut 
ranging from 0 to 2% of AGI.   
 
 Second, under § 68, total itemized deductions (after application of various 
provision-by-provision haircuts) were reduced by an amount equal to 3% of the 
excess of AGI over an inflation-adjusted threshold.  For high-income taxpayers, this 
provision increased effective marginal tax rates, but it would have had little impact 
on the deductibility of clawback payments since most high-income taxpayers had 
 
110 Rev. Rul. 67-48 (allowing deduction under § 165(c)(1) in year of payment of compensation 
clawed back as a result of taxpayer’s breach of an employment contract). 
111 Voluntary repayment of compensation would not be considered an ordinary and necessary 
expense and would not support a deduction.  Blanton v. Commissioner, 46 T.C. 527 (1966). 
112 IRC § 67(b). 
113 TCJA § 11045; IRC § 67(g). 
114 For example, a taxpayer with AGI of $1 million and MIDs of $25,000 would be able to deduct 
only $5000, as 2% of $1 million is $20,000.  If the same taxpayer had MIDs of $20,000 or less, her MIDs 
would be completely nondeductible. 
115 IRS Statistics of Income for Tax Year 2016 (Filing Year 2017), Table 2.1. 
116 2016 SOI Table 2.1.  Compare column 1 (total returns) and column 106 (number of returns 
with MIDs in excess of the 2% of AGI floor) for the $2 million to $5 million AGI band.  For comparison, 
the average realized compensation for “top 5” executives of S&P 1500 companies for 2016 was about 
$4.1 million.  Author’s calculation based on Execucomp data field Total_Alt2, which includes the value 
of vested stock and the net value of exercised options. 
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total itemized deductions, without clawback deductions, well in excess of the 
reduction amount.117 
 
 Third, prior to 2018, MIDs were not deductible for purposes of the Alternative 
Minimum Tax (AMT).  According to the IRS SOI, 18% of taxpayers reporting AGI in 
the $2 million to $5 million band were subject to the AMT for 2016.118  For these 
taxpayers, an additional MID, such as a deduction for a clawback payment, would 
provide no tax benefit.  For the other 82% of taxpayers, the existence of the AMT could 
have significantly curtailed the tax benefit associated with a clawback payment. 
 
 In sum, before 2018, the usefulness to a taxpayer of a deduction for a clawback 
payment as a MID was often quite limited, principally because of the 2% haircut on 
MIDs and the non-deductibility of MIDs for purposes of the AMT.  The extent to which 
such a deduction would have offset the tax impact of the prior year’s inclusion would 
have been essentially random and unrelated to the justifications for permitting or 
denying tax offsets for clawback payments. 
 
 With the enactment of the TCJA, the deductibility under §§ 162/165 of 
clawback payments is much clearer, and much harsher.  MIDs are simply not 
deductible under the TCJA for tax years 2018 through 2025.119  Absent § 1341, to 
which we turn next, an executive making a clawback payment between 2018 and 
2025 would receive no tax benefit, no offset against the tax incurred when the 
compensation was received. 
B. Tax Treatment of Clawbacks under § 1341  
 When it applies, § 1341 provides a non-miscellaneous itemized deduction or 
a tax credit for amounts repaid that were previously held under a claim of right.  
Executives contractually bound to repay compensation have successfully invoked § 
1341 to achieve complete recovery of federal income tax previously paid on that 
compensation.  However, § 1341 may not always provide complete recovery for 
executives subject to clawbacks, and there is a non-trivial question as to whether § 
1341 can be utilized by executives making clawback payments in tax years 2018 
through 2025.  This section explores the application of § 1341 to compensation 
clawbacks. 
 
1. Section 1341 Overview 
 
 
117 2016 SOI Table 2.1.  Compare column 1 (total returns) and column 60 (returns with total 
itemized deductions in excess of the § 68 limitation).  In the $2 – 5 million AGI band, those figures are 
101,941 and 101,921, indicating that only 20 taxpayers with AGI at this level reported itemized 
deductions totaling less than 3% of AGI minus the § 68 threshold.   
118 2016 SOI Table 2.1.  Compare column 1 (total returns) and column 126 (number of returns 
subject to the AMT) for the $2 million to $5 million AGI band. 
119 TCJA § 11045; IRC § 67(g). 
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 Under § 1341, if 1) an item is included in gross income in a prior year because 
it appeared that the taxpayer had an unrestricted right to the item, 2) a deduction is 
allowable in a subsequent year because it is determined that the taxpayer did not 
have an unrestricted right to the item, and 3) the deduction exceeds $3000, then, in 
the year of repayment, the taxpayer is allowed the deduction or takes a credit that is 
generally equal to the amount of tax incurred due to the earlier inclusion, whichever 
is more beneficial.120   
 
The provision is generally viewed as an ameliorating exception to strict annual 
tax accounting and the claim of right doctrine.121  Suppose that a $10,000 item of 
income was included in 2018 when the taxpayer was in a 25% marginal rate bracket 
and was repaid in 2019 when the taxpayer was in a 12% marginal bracket, and 
assume that deductibility for the repayment is clear (and fully allowed) under § 162.  
Under a strict annual accounting system, the $1200 reduction in tax in 2019 
associated with the deduction would not fully make up for the $2500 in tax associated 
with the 2018 inclusion.  But, of course, a credit for the prior year’s incremental tax, 
allowed under § 1341(a)(5), perfectly offsets the prior year’s tax.   
 
Given the disallowance of MIDs under the TCJA, however, § 1341 potentially 
can do much more for individuals subject to clawback obligations than merely 
correcting for rate changes.  Assuming that it applies, § 1341 can turn a disallowed 
deduction into an effective, allowed deduction.  Consider the example described in 
the Introduction.  Executive receives a $1 million cash bonus in 2019 that is based on 
the achievement of an earnings target, and Executive pays federal income tax on $1 
million.  In 2020, the firm restates earnings for 2019 and it is determined based on 
the restated earnings that Executive was entitled to a bonus of $700,000.  Executive 
repays the company $300,000.  Assuming that § 1341 applies, Executive would be 
entitled to a $300,000 non-miscellaneous itemized deduction in 2020 or a credit for 
the 2019 tax on $300,000, whichever is more beneficial.  Without § 1341, Executive 
would have a non-deductible $300,000 MID. 
 
2. Section 1341 Requirements 
 
Section 1341 does not apply to all repayments of previously taxed income.  
This section considers two important limitations on its availability: the existence of 
separate underlying basis for deduction and of an apparent unrestricted right to the 
income in the year of receipt. 
 
 
120 IRC § 1341(a). 
121 United States v. Skelly Oil, 394 U.S. 678, 680-81 (1969) (“Section 1341 … was enacted to 
alleviate some of the inequities” that followed from the claim of right doctrine and annual accounting); 
Rev. Rul. 2004-17 (“Congress enacted section 1341 to ameliorate th[e] inequity in cases” in which a 
taxpayer receives and includes income in one year and repays and deducts the repayment in a later 
year).   
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a.  Underlying Deductibility 
 
 Section 1341 does not create a deduction or credit out of whole cloth.  For the 
provision to apply, there must be an underlying basis for a deduction.122  As discussed 
above, however, involuntary clawback payments generally are deductible under 
§§ 162/165, whether the payer is an innocent bystander relative to an earnings 
restatement, a culpable participant in falsifying financials, or the violator of company 
policies or the terms of an employment agreement.  To be sure, a voluntary repayment 
of compensation that would not be deductible under §§ 162/165 would not support 
a deduction or credit under § 1341.123  But modern clawback regimes are almost 
always involuntary exactions imposed through regulation or pre-existing corporate 
policy, so “voluntariness” should not be an impediment to the application of § 1341.  
 
 The enactment of the TCJA, however, raises a new issue with respect to the 
underlying deductibility predicate for the application of § 1341 to clawback 
payments.  Specifically, the text of § 1341 requires that “a deduction is allowable for 
the taxable year” in which the clawback payment is made and that “the amount of 
such deduction exceeds $3000.”124  But what exactly does this mean?  An executive 
who is required to repay a $1 million bonus is allowed a $1 million deduction under 
§§ 162/165, an amount that far exceeds $3000.  But between 2018 and 2025, this MID 
is totally disallowed.  Do we look to deductibility in the first instance under 
§§ 162/165, or to ultimate deductibility taking into account limitations on the 
deductibility of MIDs?  This question could have arisen prior to the enactment of the 
TCJA, but I find no evidence that it has.  This is not too surprising given the 
infrequency of SEC application of the SOX clawback and the paucity of company-
initiated clawback actions under voluntarily adopted programs,125 as well as the fact 
that, before the TCJA, limitations on the deductibility of MIDs would have resulted in 
ultimate non-deductibility in only a subset of clawback cases.  Today, the deductibility 
of all clawback payments turns on this question. 
 
The Treasury has interpreted the statutory language quoted above as 
providing for special tax treatment under § 1341 “if, during the taxable year, the 
taxpayer is entitled under other provisions of [the Code] to a deduction of more than 
$3000 because of the restoration” of an item of income included in a prior year under 
a claim of right.126  This language seems most consistent with a restrictive, ultimate 
deductibility reading of the statute.  An ultimate deductibility reading is also 
suggested by a Treasury Regulation that explicitly provides that the $3000 capital 
loss limitation under IRC § 1211 shall not be taken into account in determining 
 
122  IRC § 1341(a)(2) (requiring as a predicate that “a deduction is allowable for the taxable 
year…”). 
123 See supra note 111 and accompanying text.  For example, the IRS would likely challenge the 
application of § 1341 to a clawback required under a company policy adopted contemporaneously 
with the triggering event, particularly if the taxpayer was in a position to influence adoption.  
124 IRC § 1341(a)(2)&(3). 
125 See supra notes 16 and 31-33 and accompanying text. 
126 Treas. Reg. § 1.1341-1(a)(1). 
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whether deductions that are capital in nature satisfy the requirement that the amount 
of the underlying deduction exceed $3000.127  There would be no need for such a 
regulation if analysis ended with deductibility in the first instance.  Needless to say, 
there is no analogous regulation addressing limitations on MIDs. 
 
On the other hand, § 67(b)(9) provides that deductions taken pursuant to § 
1341 are not MIDs.  When § 1341 applies, and when the current year deduction 
provides greater tax relief than a prior year credit, the deduction is not subject to § 
67 limitations on MIDs.  To be sure, the existence of § 67(b)(9) does not resolve the 
matter.  Section 67(b)(9) only comes into play if § 1341 applies.  But as Professor 
Douglas Kahn has argued, § 67(b)(9) clearly reflects a legislative view that repayment 
of an amount previously held under claim of right was not the “type of situation that 
warranted the limitations impose on” MIDs and that it is “not plausible” that Congress 
could have intended that the suspension of MIDs effectively reversed this 
determination.128  Kahn also argues that an ultimate deductibility reading of § 1341 
would cause the TCJA’s disallowance of MIDs to impliedly repeal § 67(b)(9), which 
would then have no application between 2018 and 2025, and he notes the strong 
presumption against such implied repeal.129 
 
I agree with Professor Kahn.  The more sensible interpretation of § 1341 is 
that relief is available if the amount repaid exceeds $3000 and the repayment is 
deductible in the first instance under other provisions of the Code. 130   We must 
recognize the ambiguity, however, and the lack of regulatory guidance or case law on 
the question.  I will assume for the remainder of my analysis that limitations on MIDs 
do not affect the availability of § 1341, but this must be considered an open question. 
 
b. Apparent Unrestricted Right  
 
 Section 1341 only applies to amounts included in income in a prior year 
because of an apparent unrestricted right that later turns out to be untrue. 131  
Embezzlers who are caught, are forced to repay stolen funds in a later year, and find 
that a change in marginal rates between the year of the theft and the repayment 
leaves them at a net tax disadvantage may not look to § 1341 for relief because they 
did not have even an apparent right to the embezzled funds in the first place.132  
 
127 Treas. Reg. § 1.1341-1(c). 
128 Douglas A. Kahn, Return of an Employee’s Claim of Right Income, TAX NOTES (June 17, 2019) at 
1819, 1821. 
129 Id (citing Posadas v. National Bank, 296 U.S. 497, 503 (1936); Branch v. Smith, 538 U.S. 254 
(2003)). 
130 See IRS, Office of Chief Counsel Memorandum SCA 1998-026 (“Section 1341 provides that 
when a substantial amount (more than $3000) held under a claim of right is restored by the taxpayer, 
the taxpayer has two alternative methods of calculating the tax liability for the year of repayment.”). 
131 IRC § 1341(a)(1) (“an item was included in gross income for a prior taxable year (or years) 
because it appeared that the taxpayer had an unrestricted right to such item”). 
132 McKinney v. United States, 574 F.2d 1240, 1243 (5th Cir.1978); Yerkie v. Commissioner, 67 
T.C. 388 (1976). 
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Unfortunately, beyond this, the IRS and courts have not settled on an interpretation 
of the language: “appeared that the taxpayer had an unrestricted right,” and the 
differences in interpretation create uncertainty with respect to the application of § 
1341 to clawbacks, and, in particular, to “bad boy” clawbacks.   
 
 In a series of revenue rulings promulgated in the 1950s and 1960s, the IRS 
interpreted the requirement that a taxpayer have an apparent unrestricted right to 
an item in an earlier year to preclude the application of § 1341 to situations in which 
a taxpayer had an actual unrestricted right to the item but was required to repay as a 
result of subsequent events.133   For example, Revenue Ruling 67-48 dealt with a 
taxpayer who was contractually obligated to repay prior year compensation as a 
result of his breach of an employment contract.134  The ruling held that the repayment 
was deductible under § 165, but not under § 1341, because the taxpayer had an actual 
unrestricted right to the compensation at the time of receipt and the repayment 
obligation “arose as a result of subsequent events,” i.e., the breach of his employment 
contract.135   
 
More recently, the IRS has softened its interpretation somewhat arguing that 
the determination of whether the taxpayer appeared to have an unrestricted right to 
the income must be based on facts in existence at the time of receipt, and not facts 
that arose subsequently.136  For example, in Dominion Resources v. United States, after 
the 1986 tax reform act reduced corporate tax rates, a utility was required to refund 
$10 million that had been collected from customers to cover deferred tax liabilities.137  
The IRS argued that § 1341 was inapplicable because, based on the facts in existence 
in the year of receipt, the utility did not appear to have an unrestricted right to the 
income; it had an actual right to the income.138   
 
 Some courts have embraced this approach.139  Other courts have rejected the 
IRS’s interpretation of “apparent unrestricted right” and have adopted a more liberal 
reading, requiring only that “the requisite lack of an unrestricted right to an income 
item permitting deduction [in a subsequent year] must arise out of the circumstances, 
terms, and conditions of the original payment of such item to the taxpayer.”140  In the 
 
133 Rev. Rul. 67-48, 1967-1 C.B. 50; Rev. Rul. 67-437, 1967-2 C.B. 296; Rev. Rul. 68-153, 1968-1 
C.B. 371; Rev. Rul. 69-115, 1969-1 C.B. 50. 
134 Rev. Rul. 67-48, 1967-1 C.B. 50. 
135 Id.  The essence of the IRS’s argument was that in a situation such as this the taxpayer does not 
hold the funds under a claim of right and does not include the item in income under a claim of right but 
simply as income from whatever source derived. 
136 Barker & O’Brien, supra note 5, at 432 (discussing the IRS’s shift from a “subsequent events” 
test to a “facts in existence” test). 
137 Dominion Res. v. United States, 219 F.3rd 359 (4th Cir. 2000). 
138 Id. at 364. 
139 See e.g., Cinergy v. United States, 55 Fed. Cl. 489 (2003) (holding that § 1341 was not available 
to a utility that had been required to refund deferred taxes to its customers as a result of subsequent 
settlement with its regulators). 
140 Dominion Res., 219 F.3rd at 367 (quoting Pahl v. Commissioner, 67 T.C. 286 (1976) (quoting 
Blanton v. Commissioner, 46 T.C. 527 (1966))).   
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Dominion Resources case discussed above, for example, the Fourth Circuit panel 
concluded that the utility’s repayment arose out of the same circumstances as the 
original collection – the creation and maintenance of a reserve for deferred income 
taxes – and thus satisfied the “apparent unrestricted right” requirement for 
application of § 1341. 
 
How does this disagreement affect the availability of relief under § 1341 for 
individuals making clawback payments?  The answer depends on the circumstances. 
 
 Let us begin with the case of an executive who is required to restore a bonus 
to her employer under a no-fault clawback arrangement that has been imposed 
through legislation or contract and who, in fact, bore no responsibility for the events 
triggering the earnings restatement, an innocent bystander, so to speak.  Section 1341 
relief should not be barred by any of these interpretations of “apparent unrestricted 
right.”  Clearly under the “same circumstances” test adopted in Dominion Resources 
and other cases, clawbacks of previously awarded excessive bonuses resulting from 
earnings restatements arise out of the “circumstances, terms, and conditions” of the 
previous year payment.  The net effect of the clawback in these cases is essentially a 
redetermination of the bonus due the executive for the prior year.  As such, these 
cases satisfy the “apparent unrestricted right” prong of § 1341 as this language has 
been interpreted by these courts. 
 
The repayment, moreover, is only trivially connected with a subsequent event 
and is dictated by facts in existence at the time of receipt.  The events that determined 
both the original payment and the clawback, e.g., the achievement of certain earnings 
targets, occurred at the same time; it was only the redetermination of the earnings 
result that occurred in a later period.  Thus, these cases should also satisfy the IRS’s 
more restrictive interpretations of “apparent unrestricted right.”   
 
Despite this, the government has argued that § 1341 relief is unavailable under 
just these sorts of facts.  For example, the taxpayer in Van Cleave v. United States was 
the majority shareholder of a closely held corporation who repaid a portion of his 
compensation, pursuant to a pre-existing bylaw and agreement, after the IRS 
determined that the portion was excessive and not deductible by the corporation.141  
The government argued that § 1341 did not apply because Van Cleave had an actual 
unrestricted right to the compensation in the year of receipt (as opposed to an 
apparent unrestricted right) and that the repayment obligation flowed from a 
subsequent event, the determination that the compensation was excessive.142   
 
The Sixth Circuit held for the taxpayer in Van Cleave, disagreeing with the 
government’s contention that Van Cleave had an actual unrestricted right to the 
compensation in the year of receipt. 143   It seems clear that the government 
 
141 Van Cleave v. United States, 718 F.2d 193 (6th Cir. 1983). 
142 Id. at 197. 
143 Id. at 197. 
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overreached in Van Cleave.  Although the IRS determined in a subsequent year that 
Van Cleave’s compensation was excessive in the year of payment, fundamentally the 
payment was excessive in the year of payment irrespective of future events.  These 
facts are distinguishable from those in Rev. Rul. 67-48 where the repayment 
obligation arose from a breach of an employment contract that occurred in a year 
subsequent to the receipt of the income.  Moreover, the facts of Van Cleave would 
clearly satisfy the IRS’s slightly more lenient “facts in existence” standard for the same 
reason.  The bottom line is that the “apparent unrestricted right” requirement should 
not be an obstacle to the application of § 1341 to “innocent” executives making no-
fault clawback payments. 
 
Slightly less certain, but still reasonably certain under all tests, is the 
application of § 1341 to SOX mandated clawbacks from CEOs and CFOs of bonuses, 
incentive-based, and equity-based pay received within twelve months of the filing of 
a subsequently restated financial statement and profits on company stock sold within 
the same period.144  While these clawbacks exceed those necessary to eliminate the 
benefit from the misstated financials, they arise out of the “circumstances, terms, and 
conditions” of the previous year payments, in the sense that the misstated financials 
would have had a bearing on bonuses and incentive/equity pay and on the price at 
which shares were sold, and given SOX, the terms and conditions under which CEOs 
and CFOs keep their compensation now include the absence of financial restatements.  
Certainly it cannot be said that these perhaps over-broad SOX clawbacks “bear[] no 
relationship” to the original compensation.145   
 
Moreover, these SOX-mandated clawbacks are predicated on facts in existence 
in the year of receipt and do not arise from subsequent events, or certainly not in the 
way that a breach of contract in year two is a subsequent event relative to receipt of 
compensation in year one.  Once again, while the restatement occurs in a later period, 
the critical underlying event – the misstated financial report – occurs before the 
compensation is received, and, again, the assumption is that the misstated financials 
affected the amount of compensation.   
 
 In the discussion thus far, I have assumed that an executive facing a clawback 
obligation was not personally involved in fraudulent activity that prompted an 
earnings restatement.  But what if she was?  Recall that employer-initiated clawbacks 
are often limited to executives directly responsible for a triggering event.  That 
triggering event might be a restatement flowing from a good faith error, or it could 
result from fraud.   
 
 Although there are no cases or Revenue Rulings directly on point, presumably 
an executive established to have fraudulently stated earnings would not be entitled 
 
144 SOX § 304(a). 
145 Cf, Bailey v. Commissioner, 756 F.2d 44 (6th Cir. 1985) (rejecting the application of § 1341 to a 
fine, later converted into restitution, paid for violation of a consent decree as the violation did not arise 
out of the same circumstances as the taxpayer’s original receipt of salary and dividends). 
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to rely on § 1341 to recover taxes on clawed back compensation based upon the 
fraudulent earnings.  The bar to the application of § 1341 would be the lack of an 
apparent unrestricted right to the compensation in the year of payment, under any 
interpretation of “apparent unrestricted right.”146  For the purposes of § 1341, the 
receipt of a bonus based on knowingly inflated earnings is akin to embezzlement.  The 
Fifth Circuit has held that it is the appearance to the taxpayer that controls,147 and, as 
the Federal Circuit has stated “when a taxpayer knowingly obtains funds as the result 
of fraudulent action, it simply cannot appear from the facts known to him at the time 
that he has a legitimate, unrestricted claim to the money.”148 
 
 Finally, what about the application of § 1341 to “bad boy” clawbacks?  
Consider a company policy requiring executives to repay or return all bonuses, equity 
awards, shares derived from equity awards, and profits from share sales within the 
last five years if the officer breaches any non-competition, non-solicitation, or 
confidentiality agreement.  Suppose an executive breaches one of these agreements 
and makes the requisite payments and transfers.  Recall that while the SOX, TARP, 
and Dodd-Frank clawback provisions are focused on financial accounting 
restatements, employer-initiated clawbacks often are predicated upon this sort of 
misconduct.  Presumably, § 1341 would not apply to such clawbacks under the IRS’s 
subsequent events test since these clawbacks are indeed triggered by events 
(competition, solicitation, breach of confidentiality) that occurred after the year in 
which the clawed back compensation was paid.  These cases seem to fit squarely 
within the confines of Revenue Ruling 67-48.149  Further, these clawbacks do not arise 
wholly from facts in existence at the time of receipt.  The risk of clawback was known, 
but the behavior that triggered the clawback occurred later.  As such, these clawbacks 
also fail the facts in existence standard for determining an apparent unrestricted 
right.  
 
 But do these bad boy clawbacks satisfy the same circumstances test adopted 
by several circuit courts of appeal?  I think that they do.  An executive receives her 
compensation subject to the clawback policy.  Her right to retain the compensation is 
contingent on compliance with its terms.  The repayment does not arise “from a 
different commercial relationship or legal obligation.” 150   The repayment is “a 
counterpart or compliment of the item of income originally received.”151 
 
 In sum, it appears that a taxpayer has an apparent unrestricted right to 
compensation, under any interpretation, and may invoke § 1341 (assuming other 
tests are met) in innocent restatement cases; but may not invoke § 1341 if culpable 
for fraudulent earnings that trigger restatements, again under any theory.  By 
 
146 See Melone, supra note 5, at 93 (reaching the same conclusion). 
147 McKinney v. United States, 574 F.2d 1240, 1243 (5th Cir.1978). 
148 Culley v. United States, 222 F.3d 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2000). 
149 Supra notes 133-134 and accompanying text. 
150 Pennzoil-Quaker State v. U.S., 511 F.3d 1364, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
151 Id. 
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contrast, § 1341 appears to reach bad boy clawbacks under the “same circumstances” 
test but not under the IRS’s more restrictive tests. 
 
3.  Further § 1341 Asymmetries 
 
 While § 1341 should provide a deduction or credit for an executive faced with 
a clawback obligation under many circumstances, the provision was not designed to 
perfectly offset the earlier tax payment, and it does not always do so.  This section 
briefly describes some asymmetries. 
 
 When it applies to clawed back cash compensation, § 1341 provides the 
taxpayer with the better of a current year deduction or what is effectively a credit for 
the prior year payment, and can result in windfalls for executives.  Suppose an 
executive receives a $1 million bonus in 2019 that she is required to repay in 2020 as 
a result of an earnings restatement.  Suppose her marginal federal income tax rate 
was 40% in 2019 and 35% in 2020.  She would have paid $400,000 in federal tax on 
the bonus in 2019 and would effectively receive a credit for that amount in 2020, as 
the tax reduction associated with a 2020 deduction would be less ($350,000).152  In 
this case, we get a perfect offset of the previous year’s tax burden.  Suppose, however, 
that the marginal rates were flipped: 35% in 2019 and 40% in 2020.  In this case, the 
executive would make a $50,000 tax profit on the 2019 inclusion ($350,000 tax cost) 
coupled with a 2020 deduction ($400,000 tax benefit), since the 2020 deduction 
benefit exceeds the credit for 2019 tax paid.153 
 
 The SEC’s proposed clawback rule implementing Dodd-Frank would require 
the forfeiture of shares issued as incentive compensation, if still held as shares, or the 
sale proceeds, if the shares have been sold. 154   Forfeiture of stock-based 
compensation could result in a disadvantageous tax asymmetry for executives subject 
to clawbacks. 
 
 Suppose in 2019 an executive receives vested stock worth $100,000 as the 
payout from a performance share plan.  The fair value will be taxed at that time.  Now 
suppose that the shares are clawed back in 2020 following an earnings restatement.  
Suppose that the executive retains and forfeits the shares.  First, suppose that the 
shares are worth $120,000 at forfeiture.  The current year deduction under § 
1341(a)(4) would be $100,000, the basis of the stock.155  The 2019 adjustment under 
§ 1341(a)(5) would be exclusion of $100,000.  Although the stock forfeited is worth 
$120,000, per Treasury Regulations the amount excluded under § 1341(a)(5) is the 
lesser of the amount restored and the amount included in the prior year.156  In this 
 
152 IRC § 1341(a)(5). 
153 IRC § 1341(a)(4). 
154 See SEC Release, supra note 3, at 46. 
155 Treas. Reg. 1.83-1(e). 
156 Treas. Reg. § 1-1341-1(d)(2)(i). 
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scenario, we have a perfect offset of earlier included income under either 
§ 1341(a)(4) or 1341(a)(5).157 
 
 Now suppose that in 2020 the fair value of the forfeited stock is $80,000.  The 
executive would still be entitled to a current year deduction of her basis in the stock 
of $100,000 under § 1341(a)(4).158  But under § 1341(a)(5), she would be permitted 
to exclude only $80,000 in recalculating her 2019 tax liability, not $100,000.159 
 
 If it turns out that marginal tax rates are the same or higher in 2020, such that 
§ 1341(a)(4) controls, the executive enjoys a full tax offset for earlier paid tax.  But if 
marginal rates are lower in 2020, such that § 1341(a)(5) controls, the cases are not 
symmetric.  An executive would enjoy a full offset of previously paid tax in the 
increasing stock price scenario but something less than a full offset in the declining 
share price scenario. 
 
To be sure, this disadvantageous result could be avoided if an executive can 
sell the shares and forfeit the cash. 160   In the declining share price example, an 
executive who sold $100,000 basis shares for $80,000 and forfeited $80,000 cash 
would still be permitted to exclude $80,000, the amount forfeited, but she would also 
have the tax benefit of a $20,000 capital loss.  Generally, executives can sell vested 
shares, in which case the differential treatment of share and cash forfeiture would 
largely be a trap for the unwary. 
 
Also, to be sure, any asymmetries in the application of § 1341 to clawed back 
compensation arising from marginal tax rate changes are likely to be a second order 
concern.  While achieving fairness for taxpayers otherwise disadvantaged by rate 
changes occurring between receipt and repayment of amounts held under claim of 
right was the rationale for the enactment of § 1341, assuming it applies in the 
clawback context, the overwhelming value of § 1341 lies in the avoidance of the prior 
limitations on and current bar to the deductibility of MIDs under IRC § 67. 
 
V. HOW WELL DOES ACTUAL CLAWBACK TAX TREATMENT ACHIEVE OPTIMAL TAX TREATMENT? 
 
This Part compares the current tax treatment of clawed back funds with the 
various objectives discussed in Part III.  I conclude that while one could argue that the 
most probable tax treatment under § 1341 is roughly consistent with unjust 
enrichment and deterrence goals, a tax regime providing for full offset of tax 
previously paid on returned compensation in all cases would be superior. 
 
157 This is a sensible result because the executive has not paid tax on the $20,000 unrealized gain. 
158 Treas. Reg. 1.83-1(e). 
159 Treas. Reg. § 1-1341-1(d)(2)(i). 
160 To repeat, the Dodd-Frank clawback provision envisions forfeiture of cash proceeds received 
on disposition of equity compensation subject to clawbacks. 
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A.  Unjust Enrichment 
 Under an unjust enrichment-focused approach, executives facing clawback 
obligations would forfeit unearned compensation and would face no net tax burden 
as a result of the returned pay.  To be sure, taxes aside, not all clawbacks work this 
way.  The SOX clawback goes beyond remedying unjust enrichment by requiring 
recoupment of all incentive pay within a window, not just excess pay, whereas the 
Dodd-Frank clawback design – requiring forfeiture of excess pay associated with the 
misstated financials – does appear to focus on eliminating unjust enrichment.  
Employer-adopted clawbacks reflect both approaches.161  
 
 To the extent that § 1341 provides a full offset for clawed back compensation, 
it is consistent with an unjust enrichment-focused approach.  Recall that, as 
interpreted by the courts in cases like Van Cleave and Dominion Resources, § 1341 
would apply to “bad boy” clawbacks and to restatement-driven clawbacks, except for 
cases in which executives are culpable in financial misstatement.  In cases in which 
executives are culpable, § 1341 would not apply, and under current law these 
executives would receive no deduction or credit for tax paid on the compensation that 
was later returned, creating a tax penalty, not just a corrective for unjust enrichment.  
Moreover, the IRS is likely to be less generous than the courts in its application of § 
1341, refusing, for example, to apply it to “bad boy” clawbacks that fail its “apparent 
unrestricted right” test.  This too would be excessive under an unjust enrichment 
approach.  As noted above, even when § 1341 applies, it does not always result in a 
perfect tax offset, but those differences seem secondary (from an unjust enrichment-
remedying perspective) to its failure to provide any offset in certain situations. 
 
 To be sure, the argument that clawback rules should prevent unjust 
enrichment but do no more is most compelling in the case of no-fault, restatement-
driven clawbacks.  So to that extent, one could argue that the fit between § 1341 
treatment and the unjust enrichment ideal is not far off the mark.   
B.  Deterring Financial Misreporting 
By allowing for full tax offsets with respect to restatement-triggered 
clawbacks, except for cases in which executives are culpable in financial 
misstatement, § 1341 appears to be reasonably consistent with an objective of 
deterring financial misreporting.  Although the loss of a deduction for falsifiers goes 
beyond unjust enrichment, at first blush, at least, this loss raises few concerns with 
over-deterring accounting fraud.  The loss of the deduction creates a penalty for 
misreporting when detected, and the optimal amount of accounting fraud is zero. 
 
 But all is not quite so simple.  An executive faced with a clawback obligation in 
the wake of a restatement might be a wholly innocent bystander, having nothing to 
do with the misstatements whatsoever, an obviously culpable fraudster, or something 
 
161 See supra Part II. 
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in between, perhaps an executive responsible for financial reporting who has no 
knowledge of the underlying misstatements.  Or perhaps her knowledge is unclear.  
Or perhaps the legitimacy of the original financials was debatable.  In which of these 
cases would we say that the executive did not have an apparent unrestricted right to 
the income and would not be entitled to tax offsets under § 1341?  At the very least, 
reliance on § 1341 for tax offsets for restatement-triggered clawbacks introduces 
potential litigation into the determination of an executive’s culpability.  At most, the 
lack of tax offsets for culpable (whatever that means) financial misreporting could 
result in overly conservative reporting practices, as discussed in the next section. 
C. Mitigating Excess Risk-Taking Incentives 
 Although we desire zero accounting fraud, not all aggressive financial 
reporting positions are fraudulent, and shareholders may benefit from reasonable, 
aggressive reporting.  The unavailability of § 1341 for culpable mis-reporters could 
inhibit that healthy activity.   
 
 Some clawback provisions target substantive risk taking with triggers ranging 
from misconduct to violation of fiduciary duty to detrimental activity to explicit 
excessive risk taking.162  These triggers are analogous to the “bad boy” clawback 
triggers previously discussed – violation of non-competition, non-solicitation, or non-
disclosure agreements.  Under some readings of § 1341, the provision would allow 
for tax offsets for clawbacks triggered by such activity.  The IRS’s more restrictive 
reading might not.  Meanwhile, it is difficult to design an optimal deterrence scheme 
for “excessive” risk taking.  All we know is that this is an activity that can be over-
deterred.  To the extent that firms optimally, or at least thoughtfully, design forfeiture 
for excessive risk-taking provisions, they are more likely to do so on a pre-tax than 
post-tax basis, particularly given variation in executive tax positions, as discussed 
below.  Thus, a scheme that fails to fully offset taxes on clawed back compensation 
poses a real risk of over-deterrence.163 
D.  Fairness 
 As discussed above,164 the fairest scheme for taxing clawbacks – the approach 
that is most consistent executive to executive and least likely to punish innocents – 
would provide full offsets for taxes on clawed back compensation.  Given the fact that 
some executives may meet clawback obligations out of pre-tax funds (untaxed equity 
or deferred compensation) while others have access only to after-tax funds, anything 
 
162 BBBCS, supra note 4, at 45 (misconduct and negligence of fiduciary duty (52%); detrimental 
activity (11%); excessive risk taking (1%)). 
163 This is not to suggest that deterrence of fraudsters is an unimportant goal.  Tax rules, however, 
would seem to be a relatively ineffective and inefficient tool.  There are other means of deterring 
accounting fraud, including SEC sanctions, reputational harm, potential loss of employment, etc.  There 
is no reason to rely on the tax code to deter fraudsters, and given the risk of mistake, accounting fraud 
is better not enforced through the tax rules applicable to clawbacks. 
164 See supra Part III.C. 
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less that full offset can result in unintentional inconsistency.  Moreover, except in a 
system in which culpability is incontrovertible, tying offsets to culpability, as § 1341 
does, will inevitably result in some mistaken deduction disallowances, and/or the 
need for litigation. 
E.  Dynamic Responses 
 How we tax clawbacks matters.  If full tax offsets are not allowed, companies 
will be less likely to adopt clawback provisions voluntarily, will tend to adopt weaker 
clawback provisions, and will tend to enforce clawback provisions less strictly.  
Section 1341 approaches full offset, but the gaps, or perhaps more importantly, the 
risk of gaps in its coverage is likely to influence firms in the directions I’ve just 
outlined. 
 
 But what about mandatory clawbacks?  Surely firms can’t avoid these, and so 
a scheme that provides less than full offset of taxes paid on clawed back funds 
shouldn’t have negative behavioral consequences, right?  Wrong.  First, to the extent 
that companies have discretion in enforcement, they will use that discretion to a 
greater degree if tax offsets might not be available.  Second, if tax offsets are 
incomplete or uncertain, companies might expend greater effort or cost in designing 
compensation to minimize the risk that their executives will face clawbacks.165  Third, 
executives facing the possibility of asymmetric tax treatment may make greater use 
of deferred compensation, which might be good or bad, but is certainly distorting.  
Fourth, executives are likely to demand and receive additional compensation to make 
up for the tax risk associated with potential clawbacks or to demand gross-ups 
(explicit or implicit) for any tax losses actually incurred.  All of which is suboptimal. 
 
VI.  OTHER RESPONSES TO LIMITED DEDUCTIBILITY OF CLAWBACK PAYMENTS 
 
This part considers two other potential dynamic responses to limited 
deductibility of clawback payments under current tax rules that merit somewhat 
fuller exploration.  First, some companies and executives may opt for a “self-help” 
solution to limited clawback payment deductibility electing to defer receipt of and tax 
on some incentive pay.  This approach will “work” for tax purposes, but care must be 
taken to avoid incurring a § 409A penalty tax on clawed-back deferred compensation.  
Second, some companies might attempt to avoid deduction limitations by reducing 
compensation of executives subject to clawback obligations in subsequent years 
instead of requiring these executives to actually repay compensation.  In my view, this 
approach is unlikely to “work” for tax purposes.  
A.  Clawbacks of Deferred Compensation and IRC § 409A   
 
165 This incentive exists even with full tax offsets but the incentive is greater if full offsets are not 
assured. 
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 Firms and executives can avoid the problem of inadequate tax offsets for 
clawback payments by ensuring that any clawed back compensation has not been 
subjected to tax in the first place.  This could be done by extending the vesting periods 
for incentive compensation beyond likely clawback windows.  It could also be 
accomplished by deferring sufficient compensation, pursuant to employer-operated 
nonqualified deferred compensation (NQDC) programs, to cover any conceivable 
clawback obligation. 166   However, while these strategies avoid the possibility of 
executives paying unrecoverable tax on ultimately clawed back compensation, they 
also raise potential headaches under IRC § 409A.   
 
Enacted in the wake of the Enron debacle and other corporate scandals, § 409A 
tightens the rules on NQDC and imposes significant penalties on NQDC that fails to 
comply with those rules.167  NQDC is defined very broadly under § 409A to include 
equity compensation, if not exempted, as well as traditional NQDC plans, such as 
elective nonqualified defined contribution plans and nonqualified defined benefit 
pension plans. 168   Although nonqualified stock options and restricted stock also 
provide for deferral, the regulations under § 409A specifically exempt these equity 
compensation instruments from the rules, 169 but these equity instruments are in 
decline at public companies.170  The newly ascendant equity instruments – restricted 
stock units and performance shares – may be subject to § 409A, depending on their 
design. 
 
Let’s focus on elective NQDC, which is clearly subject to § 409A.  Suppose an 
executive makes an election to defer her 2018 annual bonus under her firm’s elective 
NQDC plan.  If a number of well-defined rules are followed, the executive will not be 
taxed on that bonus in 2018, but will be taxed on the bonus and any investment 
earnings on that bonus at payout.171  In order to satisfy § 409A, in particular, the 
payout must be made on a predetermined date or dates or upon the occurrence of 
another § 409A-sanctioned event, such as death, disability, or severance.172  Payout 
may not be accelerated.173   
 
166 See supra note 60 and accompanying text. 
167 The primary requirements under § 409A have to do with the timing of elections to defer 
compensation (§ 409A(a)(4)) and the timing of payouts (§ 409A(a)(2)).  NQDC that does not comply 
with the § 409A rules is subject to taxation at vesting and to an additional 20% penalty tax.  IRC 
§ 409A(a)(1). 
168 These plans are analogs of more familiar tax-preferred qualified defined contribution plans, 
such as 401k plans, and qualified defined benefit pension plans. 
169 Treas. Reg. § 1.409A-1(b)(5)(i)(A) (nonqualified stock options); Treas. Reg. § 1.409A-1(b)(6) 
(restricted stock). 
170 See Walker, supra note 97, at 405-08. 
171 See Miller, supra note 60 at 255.  In order to achieve tax deferral, a nonqualified deferred 
compensation obligation must represent only an "unfunded and unsecured promise to pay money or 
property in the future” (Treas. Reg. § 1.83-3(e)), participants must be "general unsecured creditors" of 
the employer (Rev. Proc. 92-65, 1992-2 C.B. 428), and the arrangement must satisfy the requirements 
of IRC § 409A. 
172 IRC § 409A(a)(2). 
173 IRC § 409A(a)(3). 
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Suppose the 2018 bonus is clawed back in 2020.  The good news, tax-wise, is 
that because the deferred bonus was not taxable (to the executive or the firm) in 
2018, no offsets are required in 2020.  The concern is whether the transfer out of the 
executive’s NQDC account back to the company represents an impermissible payout, 
acceleration, or substitution under § 409A.   
 
I am not aware of any authority on this question.  Some practitioners have 
recommended drafting clawback policies to pull funds from sources other than NQDC 
in order to avoid potential problems under § 409A.174   Other practitioners, however, 
recommend drafting clawback provisions to provide for the “forfeiture” of NQDC that 
is clawed back, rather than the “repayment” of such compensation.175  Under the 
Treasury Regulations, a forfeiture of NQDC is not treated as a payment, and should 
not trigger the negative repercussions associated with non-complying payments 
under § 409A.176  
 
The bottom line here is that while NQDC looks like the solution to the potential 
pitfalls associated with relying on § 1341 to recover taxes previously paid on clawed 
back compensation, there are also potential pitfalls to using this approach that are 
created by § 409A.  Ideally, the Treasury would amend the regulations to include 
clawback payments in its list of permissible distribution events or the Treasury or IRS 
would at least provide guidance confirming that a clawback forfeiture of NQDC does 
not trigger adverse consequences under § 409A. 
B.  Clawback Holdbacks 
 In implementing the Dodd-Frank clawback or their own voluntarily adopted 
clawback schemes, companies might arrange to reduce the pay of executives subject 
to clawback obligations in a future year by the amount of the obligation in lieu of 
requiring these executives to actually repay the clawback amount.177  Implementing 
clawbacks through this “holdback” technique might be administratively convenient 
for companies and less onerous for their executives.  Moreover, one might think that 
since the executives would actually repay no compensation, the tax issues discussed 
above might disappear.  The tax treatment of holdbacks is uncertain, however, and in 
my view, unlikely to be advantageous vis-à-vis the “traditional” clawback approach. 
 
174 Jeffrey T. Haughey et al, SEC Clawback Rules Have Executive Tax Consequences, Securities Law 
Insider (Oct. 5, 2015); Katherine Blostein, Clawbacks: Trends and Developments in Executive 
Compensation, Mar. 25, 2010, at 7. 
175 Leigh C. Riley, Compensation Clawbacks and Code Section 409A Acceleration, Jan. 8, 2014; 
Rosina B. Barker, Compensation Clawbacks: Tax Consequences for Issuers and Executives, Oct. 7, 2015 at 
15. 
176 Treas. Reg. § 1.409A-3(f) (providing that a forfeiture of an amount of deferred compensation 
will not be treated as a payment as long as the participant does not receive an offsetting payment). 
177  Obviously this technique would be feasible only with respect to executives who remain 
employed by the company.  Recall that the Dodd-Frank clawback applies to “current and former” 
executives who received incentive pay within the requisite window.  See supra text accompanying note 
19. 
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 Consider the example from the Introduction.  Executive receives a $1 million 
bonus in 2019 and pays tax on that amount.  Following a 2020 earnings restatement, 
it is determined that the bonus should have been $700,000.  Under the traditional 
clawback approach, Executive would be required to return $300,000 to the company 
and her 2020 compensation would be unaffected.  Under the holdback approach, 
Executive would make no transfer to the company but her 2020 compensation would 
be reduced by $300,000.  Suppose she would otherwise have been entitled to an 
$800,000 bonus in 2020.  Her actual 2020 bonus would be $500,000. 
 
 If the reason for the 2020 pay reduction is ignored and taxes are simply 
applied to the amounts paid in the various years, this holdback approach would 
eliminate any significant tax concerns.  Executive would pay tax on the $1 million 
bonus in 2019 and on a $500,000 bonus in 2020.  If her marginal tax rate is the same 
in the two years, this is essentially equivalent to paying tax on $700,000 in 2019 and 
$800,000 in 2020.178 
 
 But would the IRS tax the cash flows like this or would it disaggregate the 
transactions and tax them consistently with the traditional clawback approach, that 
is, require Executive to include $1 million and $800,000 in compensation in 2019 and 
2020 respectively and allow Executive a $300,000 deduction in 2020 subject to the 
limitations on MIDs and the potential application of § 1341?  I am not aware of any 
persuasive authority on this exact question, but there are doctrinal and policy reasons 
to doubt that this holdback approach would improve the overall tax picture for 
executives and their companies. 
 
 First, assuming that deduction of actual clawback payments does not fully 
offset the tax incurred on the original receipt, ignoring the underlying reality behind 
the holdback approach would result in inconsistent treatment of companies or 
executives employing the two techniques.  For example, former executives subject to 
the Dodd-Frank clawback would not be able to avail themselves of the holdback 
option and might be penalized, effectively, vis-à-vis executives who remain employed.  
Of course, if deduction of clawback payments does result in a full offset of previously 
incurred tax, taxing holdbacks according to the cash flows would not result in an 
inequity. 
 
 Second, the IRS could justify a decision to disaggregate the reduced $500,000 
net compensation in 2020 in my example into $800,000 of income to Executive 
combined with a $300,000 payment to the company by analogy to IRC § 7872’s 
treatment of no/low interest loans to employees or to cases such as Collins v. 
Commissioner.179  When § 7872 applies to no or low interest loans from an employer 
to an employee, the employee is taxed as if the employee paid a market rate of interest 
 
178 I am ignoring the modest time value of money difference between taxes owed for 2019 and 
2020. 
179 Collins v. Commissioner, 3 F.3d 624 (2d Cir. 1993).   
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to the employer and the employer simultaneously paid the employee the same 
incremental amount in additional compensation.  This disaggregation is analogous to 
deeming $300,000 as additional compensation in 2020 in my example offset by a 
deemed $300,000 clawback payment.  In Collins, the taxpayer, an employee at an off-
track betting parlor, entered bets totaling $80,000 on his own behalf, without paying 
for them.  After incurring net losses of $38,000, he turned himself in to his boss, 
turned over his $42,000 of winning tickets, and was fired.  Collins argued that he 
suffered an overall tax loss, but the IRS argued and the court held that the transactions 
should be disaggregated into two transactions: 1) embezzlement of $80,000 and 
repayment of $42,000, and 2) a non-deductible gambling loss of $38,000.  Again, this 
disaggregation process seems analogous to the likely treatment of compensation held 
back to cover an obligation to repay compensation. 
 
 Third, there is at least one (admittedly non-precedential) private letter ruling 
in which the IRS disaggregates a compensation holdback in just such a scenario.  In 
PLR 9103031, one group of employees was determined to have received excessive 
bonuses and the company was required to reduce their subsequent wages by the 
excess amount in order to create a pool of funds to distribute to another group of 
employees who had received inadequate bonuses.  The IRS held that the amounts 
subtracted from the wages of the over-compensated employees would be included in 
the income of these employees and that these “employees may take account of 
repayment of wages received in a prior year for federal income tax purposes only by 
taking the repayment as an itemized deduction….”180   
 
 In sum, while it is possible that a clawback holdback approach might avoid 
adverse tax consequences associated with actual repayments in situations in which 
executives facing obligations remain employed by the company, it would be unwise 
to rely on this technique and favorable tax treatment as a global solution to the issue. 
 
VII. CONCLUSION AND THE ROAD AHEAD 
 
From a corporate governance perspective, I prefer strict, comprehensive, no-
fault clawbacks of excess pay associated with earnings restatements.  I have never 
understood why it isn’t obvious that unearned compensation should be returned to 
shareholders.  Of course, shareholders will pay for this in the sense that executives 
will demand greater compensation to offset the clawback risk.  This is fair enough.  
Another way to look at the current situation is that, absent clawbacks, an element of 
executive pay is the opportunity to retain unearned compensation.  It is fairer and 
more efficient to tie incentive pay to actual results and compensate executives ex ante 
for eliminating these windfalls.181 
 
 
180 PLR 9103031 (citing Rev. Rul. 79-311, 1979-2 C.B. 25). 
181 See Fried & Shilon, supra note 5, at 728 (arguing that allowing executives to profit from 
misstated financials – whether random or purposeful – is an inefficient form of compensation). 
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This perspective is consistent with an unjust enrichment approach to 
clawbacks and clawback taxation and to a tax scheme that provides for full offset of 
any tax previously paid by executives on compensation that is subsequently returned.  
Deterrence rationales for clawbacks are also plausible and these rationales might 
justify a more punitive tax scheme, i.e., something less than full offset, but other 
considerations – fairness, consistency, minimizing distortions and litigation – weigh 
against an asymmetric tax regime.  
 
So what is to be done?  Ideally, Congress would adopt legislation that would 
provide individuals with a credit for tax paid on compensation that is subsequently 
returned to their companies as a result of a clawback.  Ideally, this tax treatment 
would apply to all clawbacks irrespective of culpability and the basis for the clawback 
(restatement, breach of contract, etc.).   
 
  Under current tax rules, the recovery of taxes paid by executives on clawed 
back compensation is basically an all or nothing proposition – if § 1341 applies, the 
executive will be made whole; if § 1341 does not apply, the deduction will be 
completely disallowed as a miscellaneous itemized deduction.  In the case of 
restatement-based clawbacks, the difference between full offset and no offset turns 
on culpability.  The dollars at stake will be large, and one can expect extensive 
litigation over culpability under such a regime.  Thus, while limited or even no 
recovery of tax by fraudsters might be reconciled with a deterrence rationale for 
clawbacks, distinguishing between culpable and non-culpable executives would lead 
to costly and unnecessary litigation over culpability.  There are better ways to deter 
fraud. 
 
 I am relatively unconcerned about clawbacks for bad boy behavior, which are 
essentially liquidated damages provisions.  Presumably, if firms and executives face 
asymmetric tax treatment with respect to clawbacks, they can find other, more tax 
efficient ways, of deterring these behaviors.  Nonetheless, my inclination would be to 
provide for full tax offsets for these clawbacks, as well, as this seems to best facilitate 
private ordering, and because I cannot see why the government should take a cut out 
of such arrangements through asymmetric tax treatment.   
 
 Of course, we are unlikely to see a legislative response along these lines.  Even 
if one could overcome the usual congressional dysfunction, the legislation I am 
suggesting has particularly poor optics.  I am suggesting that executives receive a tax 
deduction for amounts repaid to their employers (or a credit for taxes previously 
paid) even in cases in which someone has cooked the books.  This seems unlikely.  
Indeed, the more likely legislative response would be a move to deny deductibility 
when and if permitted under § 1341.  It will be claimed, inaccurately, but predictably, 
that such deductions represent a taxpayer subsidy for crooked executives.  
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 As I have argued elsewhere, the disallowance of a business-related tax 
deduction tends to be conceptualized as the elimination of a taxpayer subsidy.182  
Despite the fact that the U.S. income tax system is based on net, not gross, income, in 
thinking about any particular deduction, observers tend to adopt a pre-deduction, 
gross income baseline, according to which deduction equals subsidy. 183   This 
tendency, I argue, is compounded by the inherent ambiguity of deductions in a net 
income tax system. 184  Some deductions are subsidies.  These deductions extend 
beyond those needed to compute net income under any reasonable definition of the 
term.  And this inherent ambiguity facilitates effective rhetoric that labels certain 
deductions that are needed to reach net income as taxpayer subsidies.185 
 
 As an example of these pathologies, I offered the IRC § 162(m) limitation on 
the deductibility of certain compensation paid to senior executives of public 
companies.186  An employer must be allowed a deduction for employee compensation 
to reach net business income under any conception of the term, and thus deductions 
for compensation clearly are not subsidies.187  Compensation may be excessive and 
ripe for regulation, but if actually paid, a deduction for compensation is appropriate 
in determining net income.  Nonetheless, policy makers were able to exploit the 
tendency to frame deductions as subsidies and the ambiguity of deductions in 
justifying the 1993 enactment of § 162(m), with President Clinton arguing that “the 
Tax Code should no longer subsidize excessive pay of chief executives and other high 
executives.” 188   Of course, the fact that corporate executives were and are an 
unpopular bunch also didn’t hurt efforts to curtail these deductions. 
 
 In the case of clawback payments, a deduction for amounts repaid or a credit 
for taxes previously imposed on the returned compensation simply restores the 
status quo ante.  One would think that careful consideration of the matter would 
reveal that tax deductions or credits in this situation are not taxpayer subsidies for 
this very reason.  But I am not sanguine.  Tax credits sound like and generally are 
subsidies.  Think of the Earned Income Tax Credit, 189  the Child Tax Credit, 190  or 
various educational credits.191  These credits are all fairly characterized as subsidies 
delivered through the tax code.  A credit for the taxes paid on returned compensation 
would be an exception.  And even a deduction for the repaid compensation can be 
 
182 David I. Walker, Suitable for Framing: Business Deductions in a Net Income Tax System, 52 WM. 
& MARY L. REV. 1247 (2011). 
183 Id. at 1262.  There are several reasons that this is the natural baseline.  For one, outside of the 
tax context, to “deduct” generally does mean to subtract from some baseline. 
184 Id. at 1263. 
185 Id. at 1269. 
186 Id. at 1268.  Enacted in 1993, IRC § 162(m) limited deductions by public companies for senior 
executive (“top five”) pay to $1 million per executive per year with a generous exception for 
performance-based pay.  That exception was eliminated by the TCJA.  See supra note 55. 
187 Id. at 1266. 
188 Id. at 1268. 
189 IRC § 32. 
190 IRC § 24. 
191 IRC § 25A (allowing the American Opportunity Tax Credit and Lifetime Learning Credit). 
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convincingly framed as a subsidy, just as the tax deduction for executive pay was 
framed as a subsidy.   
 
 Even if I am wrong about the likelihood of a legislative push to explicitly deny 
deductions or credits with respect to clawed back compensation, I think it extremely 
unlikely that Congress would enact legislation to explicitly grant such deductions or 
credits.  In my view, the best we can realistically hope for, legislatively, is stalemate.  
And absent a legislative response, I would encourage the courts and the IRS to 
interpret § 1341 liberally to apply to all clawback payments except for cases in which 
executives are clearly culpable for misstated financials; for fraud, in other words.  One 
cannot square the application of § 1341 to fraud, and one should not try, but in all 
other cases the courts and IRS should attempt to achieve the full tax offset ideal. 
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